Supply chain finance is a crucial topic. In this paper, we consider that a capital-constrained manufacturer can borrow money from either a bank (bank credit financing) or a retailer (trade credit financing). Our analysis compares supply chain performance under these two financing schemes. Furthermore, we extend our model to evaluate the impacts of retail competition and supply chain member's risk aversion on supply chains, which consist of one capital-constrained manufacturer and two competing retailers. We consider three financing schemes: only bank credit financing, dual trade credit financing, and bank and trade credit mix financing. We find that without retail competition, the retailer is always willing to use the trade credit financing; whereas with retail competition, if one retailer provides the trade credit but the other does not, the credit provider could receive the superior profit. Thus, providing an appropriate trade credit financing scheme is critically important for retailers. Moreover, we find that without retail competition, when a trade interest rate is relatively low, both the retailer and manufacturer could reach a win-win situation in the trade credit financing. However, with retail competition, supply chain members (i.e., two retailers and one manufacturer) will not have an all-win situation no matter which specific financing scheme is adopted and only a win-win-lose situation exists when using the credit mix financing scheme or the dual trade credit financing in supply chains. Last but not least, regardless of risk neutrality or aversion of supply chain members, their pricing decisions among three financing schemes are similar. This implies that the impacts of supply chain members' risk aversion are limited in supply chain financing scheme selection. More managerial insights are discussed. Fig. 1. The manufacturer's optimal decisions among three financing schemes in terms of various retailers' interest rates (we set α 0 = 10, δ = 0.5, c = 0.1, σ = 5, r f = 0.01, r b = 0.05, F 1 = 5, F 2 = 5, and C = 8). Proposition 5.(then π BC * M > π TC * M > π BT * M ; (ii) Q 1 > r b > N 1 , then π BC * M > π BT * M > π TC * M ; (iii) min{Q 1 , L 1 } > r b , then π TC * M > π BC * M > π BT * M ; (iv) N 1 > r b > Q 1 , then π TC * M > π BT * M > π BC * M ; (v) r b > max{Q 1 , L 1 }, then π BT * M > π BC * M > π TC * M ; (vi) L 1 > r b > N 1 , then π BT * M > π TC * M > π BC * M .

No abstract

No abstract

A new protocol for C-Se and C-N bond formation by the direct difunctionalization of alkenes is reported. The protocol is operationally simple, has a wide substrate scope, and uses readily available amino sources. This reaction represents a significant addition to the limited number of intermolecular selenide difunctionalization reactions of alkenes and would find practical application in the synthesis of nitrogen- and selenium-containing molecules.