Age of Information (AoI) is studied in two-user broadcast networks with feedback, and lower and upper bounds are derived on the expected weighted sum AoI of the users. In particular, a class of simple coding actions is considered and within this class, randomized and deterministic policies are devised. Explicit conditions are found for symmetric dependent channels under which coded randomized policies strictly outperform the corresponding uncoded policies. Similar behavior is numerically shown for deterministic policies.
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider a base case and two generalizations: (i) one MNO and one MVNO, (ii) one MNO, one MVNO and an outside option, and (iii) two MNOs and one MVNO. In each of these cases, we model the interactions of the service providers (SPs) using a sequential game, identify when the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) exists, when it is unique and characterize the SPNE when it exists. The characterizations are easy to compute, and are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. We identify metrics to quantify the interplay between cooperation and competition, and evaluate those as also the SPNEs to show that cooperation between MNO and MVNO can enhance the payoffs of both, while increased competition due to the presence of additional MNOs is beneficial to EUs but reduces the payoffs of the SPs.
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