This paper uses data from all the listed high-tech enterprises in China, from 2013 to 2018, as the samples employed to study the impact of government subsidies on the innovation of high-tech enterprises, as well as the subsidy mechanism. The mechanism is analysed mainly from the perspectives of resource effect and signal transmission effect. In the theoretical analysis, from the perspective of resource effect, the capital guiding role of government subsidies is considered. In addition, this study creatively discusses the impact of rent-seeking behaviour in combination with China's anti-corruption practice. From the perspective of signal transmission, government subsidies are no longer only interpreted as positive signals of the government being in favour of enterprise financing. This study further believes that government subsidies transmit a signal to the public, encouraging them to strengthen their supervision of subsidised enterprises. A multiple regression model and mediating effect model indicate that government subsidies achieve the purpose of stimulating enterprise innovation. The stimulating effect of government subsidies through financing constraints and signal transmission is 9.48% and 10.16%, respectively. These results are consistent with the positive externality theory and the signal transmission theory. At the end of the paper, several relevant suggestions are presented, according to the current developments.

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This paper investigates the impact of managerial ability on idiosyncratic volatility from the perspective of corporate information. Using the companies listed on the Shenzhen A-share Main Board from 2003 through 2017, we test the relationship between managerial ability and the quality of information disclosure. We further explore the internal mechanism by which managerial ability impacts on idiosyncratic volatility. The empirical results show that competent managers reduce idiosyncratic volatility by improving corporate transparency. In other words, corporate transparency plays an intermediary role. Competent managers disclose higher quality information. In turn, reputable management and high-quality company information attract more attention and information mining. This improves corporate transparency, which can reduce arbitrage space and alleviate the idiosyncratic volatility of the stock price. Our main findings survive a series of robustness tests including an alternative measure of managerial ability, the application of a 2SLS regression and so on.

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