The purpose of the dual-credit policy is to promote the healthy and sustainable development of China’s new energy vehicle industry. This study took the dual-credit policy as the background, took the new energy vehicle listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China as the research object, and used the difference-in-difference model to verify the impact of the dual-credit policy on the performance of new energy vehicle companies and identify the mechanism behind its role. The study found the following: (1) the dual-credit policy significantly improves the performance of listed new energy vehicle companies, but the marginal utility of the policy will diminish; (2) the impact of the dual-credit policy on the performance of domestic listed new energy vehicle companies is better than that of joint venture listed new energy vehicle companies; (3) the dual-credit policy mainly enhances the competitiveness of listed new energy vehicle companies through the market expectation of enterprises and market competition mechanism; (4) there is heterogeneity in the mechanism of the dual-credit policy for domestic and joint venture new energy vehicles. The research in this paper is helpful for evaluating the economic effect of the dual-credit policy, and it has implications for the healthy and orderly development of the new energy vehicle industry.

The aim in mind in the construction of a zero-waste city is to recycle municipal solid waste in a more reasonable way in order to achieve the sustainable development of the urban environment. This goal is widely used internationally as a green development concept in urban management. However, when only the government takes the lead in the construction process, neglecting to engage and guide the participation of the public and of enterprises, the realization of a zero-waste city becomes challenging. Therefore, effective collaboration among all stakeholders would be a more effective approach to dealing with solid waste and creating an eco-friendly and livable urban environment. In this study, we adopted an evolutionary game model and selected three typical stakeholders—the government, the public, and enterprises—in order to examine the choice of tripartite strategies and their primary influencing factors based on prospect theory. This study found the following: (1) the selection of tripartite strategies at different stages of a zero-waste city’s construction is influenced by the expected benefits and costs; (2) the government’s leading role and related subsidies can promote the enthusiasm of enterprises and the public to participate in the construction of a zero-waste city; (3) tripartite participation in a zero-waste city’s construction can maximize benefits, and after a sustainable development model has been established, each stakeholder can choose to participate actively, even without government intervention; and (4) the construction of a zero-waste city requires long-term exploration and practice, and China is currently in a transition period from government-led to government-directed planning. Establishing a perfect reward and punishment mechanism is beneficial in promoting the active participation of the public and of enterprises. The authors of this paper studied the game process of stakeholders at each stage of a zero-waste city’s construction through prospect theory and explored the influences of important parameters on the strategic choice of each subject at the current stage by conducting numerical simulations, which has implications for the construction and sustainable development of a zero-waste city.