This paper shows that optimal trade policies for vertically related markets depend crucially on production technology. By employing a production function with variable-coefficient technology, it shows that return to scale is crucial in determining the direction of government intervention. Therefore, the assumption of fixed-coefficient production technologies, which has been popular in industrial organization and trade literature when modeling vertically related markets, should be used with caution. Copyright � 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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This paper reviews the economic and managerial literature on the relationship between energy-ICT and the development of the green energy economy. It is summarized that there are four lines of existing literature on energy-ICT: cost and benefit analysis, fair competition issues, cybersecurity issues, and promotion policy issues. Even though ICT is energy-consuming, most of the existing empirical studies support the idea that energy-ICT has net positive effects on energy savings, energy efficiency improvement, emission reduction, and economic growth at both enterprise and economy-wide levels. Energy-ICT equips the platform operator with higher bargaining power, such that a governance mechanism to assure the fair access right of each entitled participant is required. A smarter energy-ICT network also becomes riskier, and hence the cybersecurity protection is more important than before. Future research and development opportunities remain on these issues of the fair competition, cybersecurity, and promotion policy of energy-ICT.

This paper employs a model to compare the welfare between optimal specific and ad valorem export subsidies if the subsidy payment is financed by distortional taxation. It is found that the welfare under the specific subsidy regime is higher (lower) than that under the ad valorem subsidy regime if the social cost of taxation distortion is low (high). Moreover, the signs of the two optimal subsidies are also crucially dependent on this social cost. They are positive (negative) if the social cost is low (high).

We investigate the upstream public firm's desirable option of production timing in the vertically related upstream market. We find that multiple equilibria may exist, including the Cournot‐type and Stackelberg‐type, with different degrees of privatization in the presence of upstream firms' efficiency gap. These equilibrium outcomes are also influenced by the intensity of downstream market competition. We further show the corresponding optimal degree of privatization in different phases of gradual privatization.