This paper investigates the capacity investment decision of a supplier who solicits private forecast information from a manufacturer. To ensure abundant supply, the manufacturer has an incentive to inflate her forecast in a costless, nonbinding, and nonverifiable type of communication known as "cheap talk." According to standard game theory, parties do not cooperate and the only equilibrium is uninformative--the manufacturer's report is independent of her forecast and the supplier does not use the report to determine capacity. However, we observe in controlled laboratory experiments that parties cooperate even in the absence of reputation-building mechanisms and complex contracts. We argue that the underlying reason for cooperation is trust and trustworthiness. The extant literature on forecast sharing and supply chain coordination implicitly assumes that supply chain members either absolutely trust each other and cooperate when sharing forecast information, or do not trust each other at all. Contrary to this all-or-nothing view, we determine that a continuum exists between these two extremes. In addition, we determine (i) when trust is important in forecast information sharing, (ii) how trust is affected by changes in the supply chain environment, and (iii) how trust affects related operational decisions. To explain and better understand the observed behavioral regularities, we also develop an analytical model of trust to incorporate both pecuniary and nonpecuniary incentives in the game-theoretic analysis of cheap-talk forecast communication. The model identifies and quantifies how trust and trustworthiness induce effective cheap-talk forecast sharing under the wholesale price contract. We also determine the impact of repeated interactions and information feedback on trust and cooperation in forecast sharing. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of our results for developing effective forecast management policies. This paper was accepted by Ananth Iyer, operations and supply chain management.trust, trustworthiness, cheap talk, asymmetric forecast information, wholesale price contract, behavioral economics, experimental economics
Consumers increasingly want to know more about where and how the products they purchase are being made. To create transparency requires a company to both gain visibility into its supply chain and disclose information to consumers. In this paper, we focus on the dimension of visibility and investigate when companies can benefit from greater supply chain visibility. To do so, we design an incentivized human–subject experiment to study two key questions: (i) How does supply chain visibility impact consumers’ valuations of a company’s social responsibility (SR) practices in its upstream supply chain? (ii) What roles do indirect reciprocity and consumers’ prosociality play in affecting their valuations under different levels of visibility? In our design, greater visibility is represented by lower uncertainty in the outcomes of a company’s SR efforts. Our results show that consumers value greater visibility regarding a company’s SR practices in the upstream supply chain. This is especially true if consumers exhibit a self-serving bias and use uncertainty as an excuse not to pay for SR. We also observe that high prosocial consumers do not exhibit strong indirect reciprocity. Conversely, indirect reciprocity significantly increases low prosocial consumers’ valuations under High visibility. Our work adds to the experimental literature focusing on transparency and SR (which has primarily studied disclosure) by examining the equally important but understudied dimension of visibility. Furthermore, our results on consumer heterogeneity offer insights into what SR information resonates with a company’s target consumers. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0685 .
Whether and how trust and trustworthiness differ between a collectivist society, e.g., China, and an individualistic one, e.g., the U.S., generate much ongoing scientific debate and bear significant practical values for managing cross-country transactions. We experimentally investigate how supply chain members' countries of origin -China versus the U.S. -affect trust, trustworthiness, and strategic information sharing behavior in a cross-country supply chain. We consider a two-tier supply chain in which the upstream supplier solicits demand forecast information from the retailer to plan production; but the retailer has an incentive to manipulate her forecast to ensure abundant supply. The levels of trust and trustworthiness in the supply chain and supplier's capability to determine the optimal production quantity affect the efficacy of forecast sharing and the resulting profits. We develop an experimental design to disentangle these three aspects and to allow for real-time interactions between geographically distant and culturally heterogeneous participants. We observe that, when there is no prospect for long-term interactions, our Chinese participants consistently exhibit lower spontaneous trust and trustworthiness than their U.S. counterparts do. We quantify the differences in trust and trustworthiness between the two countries, and the resulting impact on supply chain efficiency. We also show that Chinese individuals exhibit higher spontaneous trust towards U.S. partners than Chinese ones, primarily because they perceive that individuals from the U.S. are more trusting and trustworthy in general.This positive perception towards U.S. people is indeed consistent with the U.S. participants' behavior in forecast sharing. In addition, we quantify that a Chinese supply chain enjoys a larger efficiency gain from repeated interactions than a U.S. one does, as the prospect of building a long-term relationship successfully sustains trust and trustworthiness by Chinese partners. We advocate that companies can reinforce the positive perception of Westerners held by the Chinese population and commit to long-term relationships to encourage trust by Chinese partners. Finally, we also demonstrate that both populations exhibit similar pull-to-center bias when solving a decision problem under uncertainty (i.e., the newsvendor problem).*
Economically motivated adulteration (EMA) is a serious threat to public health. In this paper, we develop a modeling framework to examine farms' strategic adulteration behavior and the resulting EMA risk in farming supply chains. We study both "preemptive EMA," where farms engage in adulteration to decrease the likelihood of producing low-quality output, and "reactive EMA," where adulteration is done to increase the perceived quality of the output. We fully characterize the farms' equilibrium adulteration behavior in both types of EMA and analyze how quality uncertainty, supply chain dispersion, traceability, and testing sensitivity (in detecting adulteration) jointly impact the equilibrium adulteration behavior. We determine when greater supply chain dispersion leads to a higher EMA risk and how this result depends on traceability and testing sensitivity. Furthermore, we caution that investing in quality without also enhancing testing capabilities may inadvertently increase EMA risk. Our results highlight the limitation of only relying on end product inspection to deter EMA. We leverage our analyses to offer tangible insights that can help companies and regulators to more proactively address EMA risk in food products.
We study a seller's optimal pricing and inventory strategies when behavioral (non-pecuniary) motives affect consumers' purchase decisions. In particular, the seller chooses between two pricing strategies, markdown or everydaylow-price, and determines the optimal prices and inventory level at the beginning of a two-period selling season. Two salient behavioral motives that impact consumers' purchase decisions and the seller's optimal strategies are anticipated regret and misperception of product availability. Regret arises when a consumer initially chooses to wait but encounters stockout later, or when the consumer buys the product at the high price but realizes that the product is still available at the markdown price. In addition, consumers often perceive the product's future availability to be different than its actual availability. We determine and quantify that both regret and availability misperception have significant operational and profit implications for the seller. For example, ignoring these behavioral factors can result in up to 10% profit losses. We contrast the roles of consumers' strategic (pecuniary) motives with their behavioral (non-pecuniary) motives in affecting purchase, pricing, and inventory decisions. The presence of the behavioral motives reinstates the profitability of markdown over everyday-low-price, in sharp contrast to prior studies of only strategic motives which suggest the contrary. We characterize how and why strategic versus behavioral motives affect decisions in distinctive manners. In doing so, this paper also introduces and determines the behavioral benefits of pricing in leveraging consumers' behavioral regularities. We advocate that tactics which may intensify consumers' misperception of availability, such as intentionally disclosing low inventory levels, can have a far-reaching impact on improving the seller's profit.*
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