The international transport corridor is the basis and carrier of economic and trade exchanges between countries and regions. International transport corridors span different countries and regions, coupled with the long distance, complicated transportation environment and process, which determines the potential risks of the operation of the transport corridors. Therefore, accurately identifying and assessing the risk of international channels are an important prerequisite for ensuring its safe and stable operation. The expert scoring method is used to collect the basic data of risk identification, and the hesitant fuzzy decision theory is introduced. The dependent linguistic ordered weighted geometric (DLOWG) operator and the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) method are used in combination. Taking the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as an example, evaluate the operational risks of the international transport corridor. The research results show that corruption, terrorism, and policy stability are the top three risk factors in the operation of the China-Pakistan transport corridor. The risk management and control should focus on these three types of risks and strengthen the security management along the route. Strengthen policy docking and communication, maintain political stability, and strengthen antiterrorism cooperation.

The construction and development of international transport corridors have become a means of cross-border space governance and promote the flexibility of international industrial chains and supply chains. Due to the uncertainty of cooperation, the development of international transport corridors entails a long-term and complex system of engineering. This paper evaluates a tripartite evolutionary game model on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors (including origin, transit, and destination countries) and analyzes the cooperation mechanism and influencing factors. The cooperative construction of international transport corridors is complex. Factors such as willingness to cooperate, transfer payments, sunk costs, and reputation have a positive impact on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors, but excessive transfer payments hinder cooperation. To promote the construction of international transport corridors, all parties need to have a strong willingness to cooperate; otherwise, the cooperation agreement has a greater probability of becoming invalid. International transport corridors with good development prospects and benefits would accelerate construction progress with the active efforts of participating countries.

No abstract