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The aim of this paper is to discuss the coopetition (cooperative competition) relationship between a manufacturer and a collector in the collection of waste mobile phones (WMPs) and examine the evolution mechanism and the internal reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for their collection strategies. A coopetition evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory was developed to obtain their common and evolutional collection strategies. The pure-strategy Nash equilibriums of this model were obtained which showed their collection strategy choices of perfect competition or cooperation. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was obtained which revealed evolution trends and laws. In addition, the optimal RPM was obtained in the sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The example of WMPs in China was taken to examine the simulation of the RPM. Results show that (i) although the manufacturer and the collector may change their strategies of cooperation and competition over time, cooperation is their best choice to increase payoffs; (ii) the optimal RPM is beneficial to propel their cooperation tendency and then to increase their payoffs.

Considering the preference of green consumers for remanufactured products, a dual-sale-channel supply chain model with government non-intervention, government remanufacturing subsidy policy, and carbon tax policy is constructed, respectively. The difference of the optimal decision between the firm and the government under the two policies is discussed in this paper. Meanwhile, we analyze the influence of green consumers on the government’s optimal decision, based on social welfare maximization. It is found that without government intervention, social welfare is the lowest. The carbon tax policy is better when the proportion of green consumers and the environmental coefficient are extreme or moderate at the same time. Otherwise, the subsidy policy is better. The carbon tax policy is more effective than the subsidy policy in controlling carbon emissions. Profit-sharing contracts should be established by enterprises and governments to achieve win–win results.

Considering the reverse logistics system composed of two manufacturers and two recyclers under the cross-competitive take-back mode, which is influenced by multiple factors (industry competition, economies of scale, government subsidies, remanufacturing rate, etc.), a model for remanufacturing reverse logistics system based on Stackelberg game is established. Then, the Nash equilibrium solution of decision variables is solved to obtain the best profit of all participants under the cross-competitive take-back mode. Furthermore, the parameter constraint analysis is carried out, and the monopolistic take-back mode is introduced for comparative analysis. Then, the sensitivity analysis of the model is carried out. At last, a case analysis is carried out based on the current situation of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling in China. The results show that the cross-competitive take-back mode is more advantageous to all participants in the reverse logistics system than the monopolistic take-back mode. Recyclers should actively sign contracts with multiple manufacturers to recycle waste products, making full use of the advantages of cross-competitive take-back mode to maximize the profits of all participants, so as to encourage them to recycle waste products and achieve sustainable development.