Natural gas distributed generation (NGDG) has been widely concerned, promoted, and applied all over the world because it has advantages such as high comprehensive energy efficiency, environmental protection, sustainable and stable power supply, and so on. It also has become an important part of the energy strategy in China. Unfortunately, most NGDG projects on production in China do not operate very well due to several reasons such as high investment and operation cost, long load cultivation period, and so on. Thus it is quite urgent to design one pricing mechanism suitable for NGDG to meet the need in the transition stage before fully power marketization and rationalize and standardize the feed-in tariff of NGDG. This paper proposes a one-part tariff mechanism for NGDG based on classified benchmark price, which solves the problem that most NGDG projects have to refer to the benchmark tariff of local coal power plants due to the absence of NGDG pricing benchmark. Meanwhile, according to the characteristics of energy projects and regions, the mechanism establishes a two-dimensional classification scheme for NGDG, sets up the benchmark data and the method to determine the values, and then put forward the benchmark tariff of NGDG. It also changes the ''one plant one price'' approach in some areas. Finally, using the tariff mechanism and operating period price model, we calculate the benchmark tariff of all kinds of NGDG in several typical regions. The results can be referenced for research and NGDG tariff mechanism establishment in various countries.INDEX TERMS Natural gas, distributed energy resource, one-part, pricing mechanism, benchmark price.The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Salvatore Favuzza.

with the policy of large consumers' direct-purchasing, large consumers can manage its risk of power purchase through direct-purchasing market and spot markets. This paper takes the semi-absolute deviation as risk measurement index, establishes an optimal model of multiple market purchasing portfolio strategy to get the minimum expected power purchase cost while the interruptible load contract is taken into account. By using mixed integer linear programming method, the proportions in the direct-purchasing market, day-ahead spot market, selfprovided power plant and interruptible load are calculated and the impact of the interruptible load and its details about the threshold price and compensating factor on power purchase decision is analyzed. The results show that the proposed model can effectively reflect the risks; interruptible load and directpurchasing market can reduce the risk of power purchase efficiently. With the increase of threshold price and decrease of compensation factor, the effect of reducing transaction risk by interruptible contracts weakens gradually.

Fierce competition in global markets and the heightened expectations of consumers have forced business enterprises to invest in and focus attention on, the relationships with their customers and suppliers. Interest in supply chain management has also been growing in the fishery industry both in developed and developing countries. Along with the occurrence of several catastrophic events in fishery supply chains, fishery risk diversity and insurance problems become more and more important. However, participants in the supply chain are separate and independent economic entities, and only consider their own benefits. In this paper, the model and the policy problems of the fishery risk diversity and insurance are studied based on the fishery supply chain insurance contract and the behavior of each participant. In this paper, for lacking sufficient knowledge about the exact probability of the fishery supply chain contract signatory or insured accidents, in the fishery supply chain risk diversity and insurance process, the fishery supply chain risk insurer uses the information supplied by the fishery supply chain contract signatory or fishery supply chain insurants and the behavior performed by the fishery supply chain contract signatory or fishery supply chain insurants to establish the parameters of the fishery supply chain insurance contract.

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