No abstract

Previous research on term‐limited legislators suggests they have few incentives to engage in pork‐barreling. Using the case of Mexico, where all legislators are term‐limited, I find legislators participate in federal budget negotiations despite the lack of a reelection incentive. I argue term‐limited legislators are progressively ambitious and use interventions into the budget process to further their careers. I find legislators elected in single‐member districts submit more budget amendments than those elected through proportional representation, conditional on where they intend to pursue future office. I also find governors and gubernatorial elections influence the submission of budget amendments, which is related to gubernatorial influence over political careers.

Objective. This article determines if the use of Spanish-language media among Latinos influences public opinion on various policy issues and group consciousness. Methods. Using a 2004 national public opinion survey of U.S. Latinos, a multivariate analysis is run to determine the effect of language media preference on immigration policy, abortion, same-sex marriage, and three measures of group consciousness. Results. I find more frequent use of Spanish-language media leads to more liberal attitudes toward immigration, but has no effect on opinions toward abortion and same-sex marriage. I also find increased use of Spanish-language media leads to increased levels of group consciousness. Conclusions. The differences in attitudes are due to the diverging goals of Spanish-language and English-language media. The effect of using Spanish-language media serves to promote a sense of group consciousness among Latinos by reinforcing roots in Latin America and the commonalities among Latinos of varying national origin.

As street-level bureaucrats, poll workers bear the primary responsibility for implementing voter identification requirements. Voter identification requirements are not implemented equally across groups of voters, and poll workers exercise substantial discretion in how they apply election law. In states with minimal and varying identification requirements, poll workers appear to treat especially minority voters differently, requesting more stringent voter identification. We explain why poll workers are different from other street-level bureaucrats and how traditional mechanisms of control have little impact on limiting poll-worker discretion. We test why many poll workers appear not to follow the law using a post-election survey of New Mexico poll workers. We find little evidence that race, training, or partisanship matters. Instead, poll worker attitudes toward photo-identification policies and their educational attainment influences implementation of voter-identification laws.

No abstract