No abstract

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers' extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

Manufacturing supply chain is vulnerable to various risks, because of its complex network structure, as well as the strong sensitivity of manufacturing to the dynamic market changes. Therefore, the management of supply chain risks has become the focus of manufacturers. To help Chinese enterprises reduce or eliminate supply chain risks, this paper puts forward several hypotheses and a risk forecast model for manufacturing through theoretical analysis. By the Amos method, the hypotheses were tested through path analysis with empirical data. Finally, an artificial neural network (ANN) was adopted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed Amos model. The study provides the reference for preventing supply chain risks and promoting the healthy development of manufacturing enterprises.

We study competition in a dual-channel supply chain in which a single supplier sells a single product through its own direct channel and through two different duopolistic retailers. The two retailers have three competitive behaviour patterns: Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg. Three models are respectively constructed for these patterns, and the optimal decisions for the three patterns are obtained. These optimal solutions are compared, and the effects of certain parameters on the optimal solutions are examined for the three patterns by considering two scenarios: a special case and a general case. In the special case, the equilibrium supply chain structures are analysed, and the optimal quantity and profit are compared for the three different competitive behaviours. Furthermore, both parametric and numerical analyses are presented, and some managerial insights are obtained. We find that in the special case, the Stackelberg game allows the supplier to earn the highest profit, the retailer playing the Collusion game makes the supplier earn the lowest profit, and the Stackelberg leader can gain a first-mover advantage as to the follower. In the general case, the supplier can achieve a higher profit by raising the maximum retail price or holding down the self-price sensitivity factor.

The article proposed the PaaS mode as a solution to the problems affecting the development of the Advertising industry in the network game. This mode has solved the bottleneck problems in such aspects as the operating mode, the IGA technology, the result supervision and the cost effectiveness, adapting well to the requirements of standardized and repeatable in the development tendency of the Advertising industry in the network game. The PaaS mode enables the Advertising industry in the network game to form a leading power which is benefit to the further clarity of the mode of the whole industry. Keywords-Advertisement in the network game IGA PaaS