Loss landscape analysis is extremely useful for a deeper understanding of the generalization ability of deep neural network models. In this work, we propose a layerwise loss landscape analysis where the loss surface at every layer is studied independently and also on how each correlates to the overall loss surface. We study the layerwise loss landscape by studying the eigenspectra of the Hessian at each layer. In particular, our results show that the layerwise Hessian geometry is largely similar to the entire Hessian. We also report an interesting phenomenon where the Hessian eigenspectrum of middle layers of the deep neural network are observed to most similar to the overall Hessian eigenspectrum. We also show that the maximum eigenvalue and the trace of the Hessian (both full network and layerwise) reduce as training of the network progresses. We leverage on these observations to propose a new regularizer based on the trace of the layerwise Hessian. Penalizing the trace of the Hessian at every layer indirectly forces Stochastic Gradient Descent to converge to flatter minima, which are shown to have better generalization performance. In particular, we show that such a layerwise regularizer can be leveraged to penalize the middlemost layers alone, which yields promising results. Our empirical studies on well-known deep nets across datasets support the claims of this work.

Scientists of multimodal communication have no established policy or default tool for sharing de-identified audiovisual recordings. Recently, new technology has been developed that enables researchers to de-identify voice and appearance. These software tools can produce output in JSON format that specifies bodypose and face and hand keypoints in numerical form, suitable for computer search, machine learning, and sharing. The Red Hen Anonymizer is a new tool for de-identification. This article presents the Red Hen Anonymizer and discusses guidelines for its use.

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The inadvertent stealing of private/sensitive information using Knowledge Distillation (KD) has been getting significant attention recently and has guided subsequent defense efforts considering its critical nature. Recent work Nasty Teacher proposed to develop teachers which can not be distilled or imitated by models attacking it. However, the promise of confidentiality offered by a nasty teacher is not well studied, and as a further step to strengthen against such loopholes, we attempt to bypass its defense and steal (or extract) information in its presence successfully. Specifically, we analyze Nasty Teacher from two different directions and subsequently leverage them carefully to develop simple yet efficient methodologies, named as HTC and SCM, which increase the learning from Nasty Teacher by upto 68.63% on standard datasets. Additionally, we also explore an improvised defense method based on our insights of stealing. Our detailed set of experiments and ablations on diverse models/settings demonstrate the efficacy of our approach.

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