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Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from realizing the full potential benefits from seed contracts. We carried out an economic experiment with real producers and organizers currently engaged in seed production to analyze their preference for group seed contracts, its sustainability and welfare implications in the seed value chain. The producers are offered two types of group contracts: B and C. Contract B involves a company-organizer-seed producer group (SPG) whereas contract C removes the organizer and directly engages with the SPG (company → SPG). In the experiment, producers are asked to choose between an existing contract and either of the proposed group contracts. The experiment consists of two treatments: (i) concealed and revealed price information between agents, and (ii) presence and absence of a local organizer while making the decision. We find that the preference for group contract B is higher than for group contract C, suggesting the need for producers bargaining which can be achieved through group contract in the existing contract, Bargaining is high (6.3 percentage points) when price information is concealed. SPGs survive for about four out of five rounds and more than half of the groups (53%) formed in the first round survived throughout the five rounds, indicating a very high group sustainability.

About SoLARSolar Irrigation for Agricultural Resilience (SoLAR) in South Asia aims to sustainably manage the water-energy and climate interlinkages in South Asia through the promotion of solar irrigation pumps (SIPs). The main goal of the project is to contribute to climate-resilient, gender-equitable, and socially inclusive agrarian livelihoods in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan by supporting government efforts to promote solar irrigation. This project responds to government commitments to transition to clean energy pathways in agriculture. All countries in this project have NDC commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and SIPs can play a significant role in reducing emissions in agriculture. About IWMIThe International Water Management Institute (IWMI) is an international, research-for-development organization that works with governments, civil society and the private sector to solve water problems in developing countries and scale up solutions.Through partnership, IWMI combines research on the sustainable use of water and land resources, knowledge services and products with capacity strengthening, dialogue and policy analysis to support implementation of water management solutions for agriculture, ecosystems, climate change and inclusive economic growth. Headquartered in Colombo, Sri Lanka, IWMI is a CGIAR Research Center. About SDCThe Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is the agency for international cooperation of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). Swiss international cooperation, which is an integral part of the Federal Council's foreign policy, aims to contribute to a world without poverty and in peace, for sustainable development. SDC, through its Global Programme Climate Change and Environment (GPCCE), helps find solutions to global challenges linked to climate change. It engages in global political dialogue and manages specific projects in the fields of energy, climate change adaptation, sustainable development of mountainous regions and prevention of natural hazards that are likely to influence regional and international policy.

The evidence on the welfare effects of kinship is mixed, suggesting both positive and adverse effects of kinship. This study looks into the differential effects of kinship on trusting and trustworthy behaviour by investigating the subjects' motives and drivers of differential behaviour towards kin and non-kin. We conducted an economic experiment with households of rural India. We found that kin are trusted more than non-kin and that differential trust towards kin and non-kin is mainly driven by higher other-regarding preferences towards kin rather than being due to differences in expected reciprocity between kin and non-kin. We observed a heterogeneous effect of kin on trustworthy behaviour: kin exhibit low trustworthiness when they are not close to other kin, while they exhibit higher trustworthiness when they have close kin in the network.

In developing countries, the emergence of informal groundwater markets is accidental rather than planned due to the water scarcity and supply-side constraints. It is less often that water markets are assessed for agents bargaining power and equity impacts. In this paper, I examine the relative bargaining power of sellers and buyers in informal groundwater markets in India. To understand the process of bargaining, a framed-field experiment is conducted with actual buyers and sellers in groundwater contracts. In the experiment, sellers and buyers make a series of choices between output-shared and fixed-price contracts under varied risk conditions, first individually and then jointly. I define bargaining power as the relative ability of the agent to influence the joint decision for their individually preferred contract type. I find that there is a large preference disagreement between sellers and buyers. Buyers have preferences for output-shared contracts while sellers' choices are motivated by expected earnings. Using the random-parameter probit model, I show that sellers have relatively more power to drive the joint decision in their favour. Nevertheless, factors like interpersonal relationships between buyers and sellers, such as kinship ties, long contractual history, and higher education of buyers augment buyers' power relative bargaining power.