The right to the truth has emerged as a legal concept at the national, regional and international levels, and relates to the obligation of the state to provide information to victims or to their families or even society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights. This article unpacks the notion of the right to the truth and tests the normative strength of the concept against the practice of states and international bodies. It also considers some of the practical implications of turning ''truth'' into a legal right, particularly from the criminal law perspective.

No abstract

Résumé L'action pénale contre les personnes accusées d'avoir commis des crimes de guerre est un aspect fondamental du droit d'une victime à la justice. Toutefois, dans les conflits armés où des violations graves du droit international ont été perpétrées massivement, il est souvent nécessaire d'établir un équilibre entre le droit des victimes à obtenir justice de manière tangible et le besoin, pour l'Ètat territorial, de traiter les atrocités passées de façon à ne pas engendrer de nouvelles violences et à stimuler le processus de réconciliation. Dans de telles circonstances, une justice réparatrice associant des amnisties limitées à d'autres mécanismes de responsabilité peut constituer un moyen d'assurer l'État de droit tout en tenant compte de la complexité du processus de transition. Quand des États vivant une situation de transition prodament de telles amnisties, il est important d'établir si celles-ci seront reconnues par la communauté internationale. Cet article analyse les règies et les principes internationaux qui fondent ou étayent la décision que prend un tribunal national ou international de reconnaître ou non une amnistie couvrant les crimes de guerre. l'auteur s'attache d'abord à déterminer s'il existe un devoir coutumier de traduire en justice les personnes accusées de crimes de guerre, quels qu'ils soient. Les effets du caractère de jus cogens de l'interdiction de commettre des crimes de guerres sont égakment examinés, tout comme la pratique plus récente des États d'établir des tribunaux spéciaux pour juger les personnes accusees de crimes de guerre. L'article fait valoir que le droit international n'interdit pas aux tribunaux nationaux et internationaux d'accorder une amnistie limitée à ceux qui sont considérés comme «les moins responsabks » de la commission des crimes de guerre, lorsque l'amnistie est associée à des mesures de contrôle et vise à faciliter l'instauration d'une paix durable.

The Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (Third Geneva Convention or GC III), generally regarded as part of the customary law of armed conflict, 1 sets out, inter alia, two cardinal principles. The first is that a prisoner of war cannot be prosecuted and punished for the mere fact of having taken part in hostilities. 2 The second is that prisoners of war must be given humane treatment from the time they fall into the power of the enemy until their final release and repatriation. 3 Prisoner-of-war status is therefore of utmost importance for a captured person in the hands of a hostile power in terms both of legal status and of treatment. If a person is not given combatant status, he may be tried for having committed a belligerent act. Where this criminal offence may be punished by capital punishment under the domestic jurisdiction, the lack of prisoner-of-war status may be a matter of life or death. Therefore, when the prisoner-of-war status of a captured person is in doubt, the question of how to resolve the determination of status takes on a crucial significance, a realization not lost on the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva in 1949 when negotiating the Third Geneva Convention. 4 Accordingly, this Convention provides that where the prisoner-of-war status of a captured person who has committed a belligerent act is in doubt, their status shall be determined by a competent tribunal. 5 The Convention does not, however, lay down the composition of the tribunal, or specify the due process rights of a person facing status determination procedures. The open-ended wording of the Third Geneva Convention's Article 5(2) begs the question of what exactly a competent tribunal consists of, and what judicial guarantees must be accorded to those who come before one. It also raises the question as to how doubt over prisoner-of-war status arises.

The use of chemical weapons in the armed conflict in Syria has attracted universal and widespread condemnation and has led to unified responses by various international bodies. This article examines the international community's responses to chemical weapons use in Syria from the perspective of international law. It also analyzes the potential options for accountability that are available for chemical weapons-related crimes. The intention is ultimately to make the case that the special status the international community has ascribed to chemical weapons crimes could be harnessed to create an accountability mechanism, such as an ad hoc tribunal, that could help pave the complex road towards a negotiated peace.