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Through a combination of a controlled experiment and a survey, we examine the effect of voting power on shareholders' voting behavior at general meetings. To avoid a selection bias, common in archival voting data, we exogenously manipulate shareholders' power to affect the outcome. Our findings suggest that, when it comes to corporate decisions involving conflicts of interest, voting power nudges shareholders to oppose management and to choose the "right" alternative, that is, vote against a proposal which prima facie does not serve the company's best interest. This effect obtained even when the dissenting vote contravened the choices of all other voters. Furthermore, the drive "to do the right thing" was established as significant, above and beyond the size of the economic stake. We also demonstrate that strategic voting among institutional investors is contingent on voting power: when in a position to affect the outcome of a vote, institutional investors tend to eschew strategic considerations and display fewer consistent patterns in their voting, compared to situations in which their ability to make a difference is limited. In anticipation of a "bad" proposal to be put to vote at the general shareholder meeting, institutional investors prefer to negotiate terms with management beforehand, and vote against it only after such negotiations fail. Our results shed new light on the "behind the scenes" processes in shareholder voting and underscore the importance of institutional investor agency to corporate governance, accountability, and minority shareholder representation. Keywords Voting power • Shareholder voting • Business ethics • Corporate governance JEL Classification G23 • G30 • G38With great power comes great responsibility.

Housing is the most important asset in the portfolio of most households. Understanding the households’ decision on housing finance has important implications from a policy perspective, due to the effects it may have on the housing prices, on the housing market stability and on household welfare. The theoretical literature on housing finance focused on figuring out the optimal choice between fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). We argue that the standard economic criteria are sometimes inadequate to explain household’s choices, which may be motivated by psychological factors. In other words, we claim that household’s choice depends only partially on the findings of the theoretical literature. We examine the effect of changes in the short-term market interest rate on the households’ choice between FRMs and ARMs. We test this effect using a unique data provided to us by the Bank of Israel, which contains detailed information on the household’s decision between FRM and ARM contracts in Israel in the past decade. The results of our analysis demonstrate a significant association between FRM preference and short-term interest rate reduction. Moreover, we find that the change in the short-term interest rate is more salient to the borrowers in periods of a high interest rate environment. We attribute these findings to Tversky and Kahneman (1974) availability and representativeness heuristics.