Successful everyday self-regulation often hinges on implementing intended responses at a later time–often in specific situations. We address this self-regulation challenge by examining the role of individuals’ thought about intended actions–and specifically whether it does or does not include situational cues. We hypothesized that including situational cues when thinking about intended actions enables stimulus-response learning, thereby increasing the likelihood of implementing the intended actions. Consequently, we pre-registered and found (N = 392, age range 18–94) a positive relationship between the self-reported habitual inclusion of situational cues in thought about intended actions and everyday self-regulation success (assessed by self-reported self-efficacy and self-control beliefs). In addition, we provide exploratory evidence that the inclusion of situational cues in thought about intended actions mediates the relationship between conscientiousness and self-regulation success. We discuss the results and the theoretical perspective in relation to how self-control outcomes can be explained by associative learning.

Action–effect learning is based on a theoretical concept that actions are associated with their perceivable consequences through bidirectional associations. Past research has mostly investigated how these bidirectional associations are formed through actual behavior and perception of the consequences. The present research expands this idea by investigating how verbally formulated action–effect instructions contribute to action–effect learning. In two online experiments (Exp. 1, N = 41, student sample; Exp. 2, N = 349, non-student sample), participants memorized a specific action–effect instruction before completing a speeded categorization task. We assessed the consequences of the instructions by presenting the instructed effect as an irrelevant stimulus in the classification task and compared response errors and response times for instruction-compatible and instruction-incompatible responses. Overall, we found evidence that verbal action–effect instructions led to associations between an action and perception (effect) that are automatically activated upon encountering the previously verbally presented effect. In addition, we discuss preliminary evidence suggesting that the order of the action–effect components plays a role; only instructions in a perception–action order showed the expected effect. The present research contributes evidence to the idea that action–effect learning is not exclusively related to actual behavior but also achievable through verbally formulated instructions, thereby providing a flexible learning mechanism that does not rely on specific actual experiences.

The present study evaluated whether subjects’ expectations and neurofeedback training performance predict neurofeedback efficacy in cognitive training by controlling both factors as statistical variables. Twenty-two psychology students underwent neurofeedback training, employing beta/theta protocol to enhance beta1 power (13–21 Hz) and suppress theta (4–7 Hz) power. Neurofeedback efficacy was evaluated by behavioral components measured on pre-tests and post-tests employing a visual continuous performance task. The results revealed a significant interaction term between change in reaction time from pre-test to post-test and expectancy effect, indicating that participants with high prognostic expectations showed better improvement in reaction time scores. The data did not reveal that actual neurofeedback performance influenced the post-test measurements of the visual continuous performance task. No significant differences were found for reaction time variability, omission, or commission errors. Possible factors contributing to the results are discussed, and directions for future research are suggested.

According to the ideomotor principle, repeated experience with an action and its perceivable consequences (effects) establish action-effect associations. Research on verbal instructions indicates that such associations are also acquired from verbal information. In the present experiment (N = 651), first, we aimed to replicate unintentional response-priming effects from verbal action-effect instructions (direct replication; Condition 1). Second, we investigated the involvement of perceptual processes in the verbally induced response-priming effect by perceptually presenting (Condition 1) versus not presenting (Condition 2) the color that was subsequently named as an effect in the instructions. Third, we tested a saliency-based explanation of the verbally induced response-priming effect by highlighting all components (action and effect) without an association between them (Condition 3). Overall, we found the predicted response-priming effect following verbal action-effect instructions (overall conditions and in the replication Condition 1). Condition 2, which did not include perceptual information in the instructions, still showed a significant response-priming effect but was descriptively weaker compared to the effect of the replication Condition 1. Condition 3, which merely highlighted the action and effect component without endorsing an association, did not show a significant effect. In sum, our study provides further solid evidence that verbal instructions lead to unintentional response-priming effects. Other conclusions must be considered preliminary: The between-condition comparisons were descriptively in the predicted direction—perceptual aspects are relevant, and a saliency-based account can be excluded—but the differences in accuracy between conditions were not statistically significant.

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