This study examines whether accruals earnings management constraints and intellectual capital (IC) efficiency affect asymmetric cost behaviour by analysing data for the 1990 to 2016 period on firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. The analysis reveals that, on average, anti‐sticky cost behaviour occurs when firms have limited ability to engage in accrual earnings management to manipulate earnings in the current year. Further, IC efficiency – particularly human capital efficiency – increases the degree of cost stickiness. This study also finds that the degree of asymmetric cost behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) period than in the pre‐IFRS period. The results suggest that the increased asymmetric cost behaviour in the post‐IFRS period derives from higher IC efficiency relative to the pre‐IFRS period. This study presents important implications for external stakeholders because they can consider the extent of earnings management constraints and the extent of firms’ IC efficiency as the determinants of asymmetric cost behaviour when assessing firms’ cost behaviour.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether aggressive pro forma earnings-reporting firms are difficult in relation to signalling sufficient intellectual capital (IC), and how the market reacts to aggressive pro forma earnings reporting. Design/methodology/approach Content analysis of 610 annual reports of Australian firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange 200 is used to obtain IC information. Fixed-effects logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used to examine the hypotheses. Findings The study finds that aggressive pro forma earnings reporting is negatively and significantly associated with sufficient IC disclosure. Moreover, this paper finds that investors react favourably to aggressive pro forma earnings reporting, and believe that pro forma earnings have greater incremental value-relevance information than statutory earnings. Research limitations/implications The coding framework used in this study comprises 33 IC items. Other studies have used coding frameworks comprising fewer or more varied IC items. Therefore, when comparing the results of this and other studies, the interpretation of the findings must recognise the differences in approach. Practical implications Sufficient IC disclosure may help investors to distinguish high-reporting-quality firms and low-reporting-quality firms. The paper demonstrates that aggressive pro forma earnings-reporting firms, which are low-reporting-quality firms, are less likely to disclose sufficient IC. Originality/value This paper is the first to examine the relationship between aggressive pro forma reporting and IC disclosure. Moreover, this paper built a theoretical framework based on signalling theory to develop research hypotheses, which extend the research on IC underpinned by signalling theory.

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This study investigates Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 200 firms in the post–Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) period (2011–2014) to examine how listed firms follow the non–International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) earnings reporting guidelines issued by ASIC to communicate underlying earnings reporting quality. We find that firms that do not comply with the ASIC guidelines have lower underlying earnings reporting quality than do firms that comply with these guidelines. Firms that do not follow the ASIC guidelines are found to exclude income‐increasing underlying earnings adjustments to make underlying earnings appear more profitable than IFRS earnings when they miss earnings targets or make current losses, and that they report underlying earnings opportunistically by excluding recurring expenses that persist into future operating earnings. Unlike ASIC non‐compliance firms, ASIC compliance firms attempt to act as responsible reporters by reporting underlying earnings in a responsible manner to demonstrate a judicious use of discretion in informing shareholders. Further, we find that underlying earnings reported by non‐compliance firms are less value‐relevant than underlying earnings reported by compliance firms.

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