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The recent surge in acts of maritime piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa stands in sharp contrast to a steep decline of such acts in Southeast Asia. In this study, we compare the development of the problem of piracy in both Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. We find that four main elements contributed to the recent decline in piracy in Southeast Asia: U.S. hegemonic interests, existing and emergent international institutions, bilateral relations among regional actors, and the density of naval forces in the region. Unfortunately, not all of these conditions are present in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the problem of piracy in that region will require new and innovative solutions.

Proponents of offense-defense theory (ODT) contend that the offense-defense balance (ODB) forms the "master key" to understanding the question of peace and war. Time-series event count models of war and militarized interstate disputes at the systemic level are used to test the theory's claims that shifts in the ODB have an important effect on the likelihood of international war and militarized disputes and that ODT offers a more powerful explanation for conflict than other explanations in the international relations (IR) literature. Results cast doubt on the empirical validity of the ODT and indicate that other IR theories have important explanatory power.In recent years, international relations (IR) scholars have rekindled a longstanding debate concerning the effects of shifts in the offense-defense balance (ODB) on the incidence of violent conflict in the international system. At the heart of the debate lies the question of whether the relative superiority of offensive military strategies and capabilities, over corresponding defensive measures, has an important effect on the likelihood of international crisis and war. That is, do factors that increase the ease and likelihood of success of offensive operations-such as innovations in military technology-make conflict and war more likely?Proponents of what is now generally known as offense-defense theory (ODT) believe that this is certainly the case. They argue that shifts in the ODB offer a powerful explanation for the likelihood of violent conflict and war in the international environment (

The Promethean Dilemma claims to challenge the current wisdom on third-party statebuilding. It contends that contemporary policy-makers and scholars mistakenly identify the early transfer of coercive capacity to local forces as the key to successful state-building. In doing so, they risk not just creating armed forces that may turn against them, but undermining long-term stability in those states-this is the crux of the Promethean dilemma. Without first building loyalty to the nation, the authors argue, the building of local coercive capabilities is more likely to prolong insurgencies and to foster future civil war than to produce stability. Successful third-party state-building requires nationbuilding before the creation of coercive capabilities, yet nation-building is a long-term process that requires at least one generation to be successful. State-building is therefore almost always likely to fail in 'contemporary settings'. For this reason, the article's main lesson arguably concerns the benefits of keeping Prometheus bound.Darden's and Mylonas's warning about the possible dangers associated with raising local forces is timely and valuable. Their analysis, however, leaves important scope conditions and policy implications unaddressed. In particular, it remains unclear what influences the severity of the dilemma and what lessons those already engaged in statebuilding efforts under fire should draw from their analysis.In our comment, we raise two related issues for further discussion. The first concerns the authors' characterization of the current wisdom and literature on third-party state-building. We believe that the authors' arguments about nation-building are at the core of the very 'current wisdom' they seek to challenge. The main difference is that the authors place less emphasis on the extreme conditions under which contemporary state-building efforts are being conducted. Our second point focuses on the causal argument, which emphasizes the appropriate sequencing of nation-and state-building efforts. Our

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