Using tournament theory as a guiding theoretical framework, in this study, we assess the organizational implications of pay dispersion and other pay system characteristics on the likelihood of turnover among individual executives in organizational teams. Specifically, we estimate the effect of these pay system characteristics on executive turnover decisions. We use a multi-industry, multilevel data set composed of executives in publicly held firms to assess the effects of pay dispersion at the individual level. Consistent with previous findings, we find that pay dispersion is associated with an increased likelihood of executive turnover. In addition, we find that other pay characteristics also affect turnover, both directly and through a moderating effect on pay dispersion. Turnover is more likely when executives receive lower portions of overall top management team compensation and when they have more pay at risk. These conditions also moderate the relationship between pay dispersion and individual turnover decisions, as does receiving lower compensation relative to the market.

In a departure from the historical focus on individual-level turnover, scholars have recently examined turnover at the collective level. Building on this work, we invoke human and social capital arguments and analyze the implications of varying rates of top management team (TMT) turnover for firm performance. Our principal finding is that TMT departures have deleterious effects on subsequent firm performance, though we find evidence to suggest that this effect is nonlinear. Results also suggest that higher levels of average organizational tenure of the TMT will modestly attenuate this negative effect. Contrary to arguments grounded in the managerial discretion literature, environmental munificence weakened the negative effects of TMT turnover rates on subsequent firm performance, whereas the hypothesized moderating effects for both industry complexity and instability were not supported.

This paper examines the influence of top management team (TMT) pay structure characteristics (such as pay dispersion, long-term variable pay, and short-term variable pay) on corporate social performance (CSP) based on upper echelon theory and agency theory. The analysis using a large panel sample of US public firms reveals that long-term oriented and egalitarian TMT pay structure has a positive influence on CSP. In addition, the negative influence of short-term variable pay on CSP becomes stronger as the pay difference among TMT members becomes greater. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings will be discussed.

The main objective of this study is to assess the influence of employment instability on firm performance in a sample of publicly traded firms. Competing theoretical arguments are considered with regard to likely outcomes associated with employment instability. A large sample of cross-sectional time-series data is then analysed using generalised estimating equations (GEE) regression techniques. Results indicate that employment instability is negatively associated with firm performance, although the relationship is also demonstrated to be quadratic (an inverse U-shaped relationship). This suggests that the main relationship varies depending upon the level of employment instability. Industry characteristics are also examined as moderators of this main effect. The results suggest a disordinal interaction effect for industry differentiation, where employment instability is negatively associated with firm performance for firms in highly differentiated industries and positively associated in less differentiated industries.

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