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Purpose From the perspective of top management heterogeneity, this paper aims to study the impact of the psychological traits of executive pay bandwagon on earnings management in the listed companies of China. Design/methodology/approach This paper applies the ratio of executive pay to the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, namely, the comparing coefficient, as an alternative variable of executive pay bandwagon, and earnings management as the behavior choice of executive pay bandwagon, to examine whether executives in the listed companies of China have comparing mentality, and whether the result is influenced by executive heterogeneity by using the multiple linear regression models. Findings The lower the executives’ compensation is than the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, the stronger the incentive the executives have to compare with others whose pay is higher, increasing the extent of earnings management in the future, and executives tend to use real activities manipulation rather than accrual-based earnings management to increase their performance-based compensation. As pay bandwagon is a kind of executives’ individual psychological reaction, in a large extent, its behavioral performance is likely to be affected by executive heterogeneity. Specifically, when the proportion of male executives, young executives or low educated executives is relatively high, or executives are located in remote cities, there will breed more earnings management behaviors induced by pay bandwagon. Further study shows that pay bandwagon is positively correlated with rigging compensation based on real earnings management and pay bandwagon also has significantly negative effects on the firms’ future value creation. Research limitations/implications Pay bandwagon is an important inducement of executives’ earnings management, with implication that for executives with different characteristics, one should pay attention to the subjective psychological perception and expectation of their pay in the future studies related to executives’ compensation incentives. Originality/value This study introduces the research within sociology, psychology and experimental economics, and considers the executives’ subjective perception of their pay, to explore the internal mechanism that executives affect firm performance via a specific earnings management method and to implement self-interested behavior due to pay bandwagon. And this is the first study to select several typical executive individual characteristics to investigate the influence of executive heterogeneity on pay bandwagon and its economic consequences.

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of executives’ self-interested behaviors induced by the pay bandwagon on stock price crash risk in Chinese listed firms and attempt to shed light on the influencing channels of this effect. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is based on the panel data set which contains information on the executives and stock price of 11,710 firm-year observations over the period 2007–2015. The multiple linear regression models are implemented to examine whether the executive pay bandwagon affects corporate future stock price crash risk. Then, earnings management, tax avoidance and overinvestment are applied as the behavior choice of executive pay bandwagon to analyze the potential influencing channels. Findings Results indicate that the lower the executives’ pay is than the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, incentives of pay bandwagon are stronger, leading to a higher future stock price crash risk. Moreover, evidence shows that the positive relationship between executive pay bandwagon and crash risk is attenuated when firms have strong external monitoring mechanisms such as Big Four auditors, cross-listing in the Hong Kong stock exchange, high marketization process and high institutional ownership. Then, some weak evidence supports that internal governance such as internal control plays the same moderating role. In addition, based on the path test, the stock price crash effect of the executive pay bandwagon has a complete tax avoidance intermediary effect and a partial earnings management intermediary effect. Originality/value This study contributes to the executive compensation literature from a psychological perspective on the economic consequences research brought about by the pay bandwagon for China’s listed firms. Moreover, this paper provides a supplement to the literature on factors which is completely different from previous studies that affect the future stock price crash risk.

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