In this article, the authors suggest a statistical analysis regarding the pattern of North Korea's local military provocations by using quantitative data. The outcomes of the logit model indicate that there are negative relationships between provocations and regime-building periods, the Cold War era, and GDP per capita (limited to internal factors), while demonstrating a positive relationship with post-purge periods. Contrary to the widespread perception that NK leaders tended to be cautious when committing local military provocations during the combined forces exercises of the Republic of Korea and the United States militaries, results show that there was no systematic relationship, while North Korea was less likely to initiate local provocations during the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. These outcomes tell us that the provocations are mostly driven by internal causes rather than external stimuli, and that North Korean leaders are more likely to utilize provocations in order to demonstrate power when they are politically strong and may have an incentive to divert internal economic discontent when the country is economically weak.

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