This study examines how firm behaviors are affected by the voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Japan, which has expanded the scope for the capitalization of intangible assets compared with the Japanese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Prior research suggests that capitalization of intangibles is preferred by firms with larger intangibles and that it enables them to increase intangible investments. Using empirical data of Japanese IFRS adopters, this study analyzes the relationship between firms' intangible asset amounts and their voluntary adoption of IFRS. The results show that (1) the more intangibles firms possess, the more likely they are to adopt IFRS, and (2) once firms decide to adopt IFRS, their intangible assets increase compared with matched non-adopters. Additional analysis shows that this increase is partly attributable to an increased volume and value of mergers and acquisitions after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the real actions of the adopters changed.

This study assessed whether acquiring firms achieve the objectives of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that are presented in their press releases and financial statements. It examined the usefulness of disclosing the M&A objectives to investors by analysing a sample of 232 M&A conducted between Japanese firms. The findings show that disclosed M&A objectives regarding profitability, efficiency, and growth are not usually realised. The results also show that describing M&A objectives in financial statements leads to higher short‐term stock returns while the stock market adjusts the valuation of firms based on their actual performance in the long run.

PurposeThis study examines the relation between negative goodwill (NGW) and operating performance after mergers and acquisitions (M&A).Design/methodology/approachThis is a comparative analysis of post-M&A operating performance for 228 transactions involving listed Japanese firms that generated negative or positive goodwill.FindingsFirst, post-M&A operating performance is lower when the transaction generates NGW. Second, the negative relation between NGW and post-M&A performance is stronger when managers have incentives for earnings management and when target firms perform poorly before M&A. Third, changes in the accounting treatment of NGW alter the relative importance of earnings management incentives and target firms' poor pre-M&A performance.Originality/valuePrior studies attribute the negative relation between NGW and post-M&A performance solely to acquiring firms' managers' earnings management incentives. The current study finds that the target firm's poor pre-M&A performance is also associated with the relation between NGW and post-M&A performance.

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