Research on markets distinguishes niche markets, characterized by local community engagement and specialization, from mass markets, characterized by arms-length exchange and large-scale production. Yet, this research often overlooks how inequality differentially underpins these forms of exchange. Building on this work, I explore how local socio-economic disparities may structure different segments of short-term rental markets in the platform (i.e., “sharing”) economy. Drawing on cross-sectional analyses of over 300,000 Airbnb listings clustered in 277 U.S. metropolitan areas, I find that microentrepreneurial short-term rental markets—involving small-scale exchanges that typically demand more personal investment and social interaction—are embedded in civically active communities struggling with economic and housing precarity. Large-scale short-term rental markets—typically involving more socially distant exchanges in which operators rent multiple properties—are prevalent in expensive housing markets, where there are real estate investment opportunities to capitalize on housing vacancies. This study thus builds on understandings of market formation and segmentation, incorporating the role of local inequality, while also illuminating the tensions within platform economy markets more broadly.

Platform economy politics reflect a trend of corporations working with civic actors to achieve shared political goals, reconfiguring once adversarial relationships (e.g., management vs. labor, homeowners vs. tenants). Yet theories on urban politics and policymaking often do not account for such “Baptist-Bootlegger” coalitions (Smith and Yandle 2014; Yandle 1983). This article analyzes how the efforts of two competing Baptist-Bootlegger coalitions shaped the 2018 short-term rental (i.e., Airbnb, HomeAway) ordinance in Los Angeles, CA, USA. I argue that a subtly coordinated partnership of housing groups, neighborhood activists, and hotel market incumbents leveraged their individual authenticity and resources to successfully articulate a shared vision with policymakers. Conversely, an opposing coalition of short-term rental platforms and hosts more explicitly combined their efforts under an organizational framework that conflated economic and moral claims; this hybrid organizational identity was perceived as less authentic by policymaking audiences and precluded potentially more strategic forms of organizing.

In 2011, the passage of Governor Scott Walker's “Budget Repair” policy retrenched collective bargaining rights for public workers in Wisconsin, a state that was the earliest adopter of these rights and locally celebrated as “union country.” In this article, I use critical juncture analysis to examine this significant case of institutional change. I argue that newly elected GOP politicians initially saw opportunity in a new legislative majority—emerging from the popularity of the Tea Party during the 2010 midterm elections—and attempted strategic policy crafting to mobilize support for this anti-union bill. However, these efforts eventually devolved into a reactive struggle for power with entrenched Democratic legislators and previous policy beneficiaries. Incorporating work on organizational deviance, I show how politicians in both parties sought to control the policymaking process with improvised oppositional tactics that undermined governing norms, ultimately resulting in the bill's passage. This study, thus, expands on theories of institutional change, illuminating the subversive politics of many contemporary movements and political parties.