Background China has continuously issued policies to speed up the interconnection, mutual recognition, sharing of medical information systems, and data integration management across regions and institutions. However, the vertical integration of electronic health records (EHRs) within the medical consortium is hampered by “poor mechanism and insufficient motivation” and the phenomenon of “free riding” among participating medical institutions, which makes the integration less effective. Objective We hope to clarify the game mechanism of stakeholders in the vertical integration of EHRs, and put forward targeted policy suggestions for improvement. Methods We constructed the “government-hospital-patient” tripartite evolutionary game model based on the detailed analysis of the research problems and their assumptions. We then simulated the game strategies and outcomes of each participant using the system dynamics approach to reveal the long-term strategy evolution mechanism of the core participants in the vertical integration of EHRs in the medical consortium, as well as the influencing factors and action mechanisms of each party’s strategy evolution to provide references for improving relevant policies. Results The evolutionary game system could eventually reach an optimal equilibrium, but in areas where the government was required to be in a dominant position, patient supervision was necessary to have a positive role, while a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism can promote active participation of hospitals. Conclusions The effective way to achieve the goal of vertical integration of EHRs in the medical consortium is to build a multiagent coordination mechanism under the guidance of the government. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish a scientific integration performance evaluation mechanism, a reward and punishment mechanism, and a benefit distribution mechanism to promote the healthy development of vertical integration of EHRs in medical consortiums.

BACKGROUND China has continuously issued policies to speed up the interconnection, mutual recognition, sharing of medical information systems, and data integration management across regions and institutions. However, the vertical integration of electronic health records (EHRs) within the medical consortium is hampered by “poor mechanism and insufficient motivation” and the phenomenon of “free riding” among participating medical institutions, which makes the integration less effective. OBJECTIVE We hope to clarify the game mechanism of stakeholders in the vertical integration of EHRs, and put forward targeted policy suggestions for improvement. METHODS We constructed the “government-hospital-patient” tripartite evolutionary game model based on the detailed analysis of the research problems and their assumptions. We then simulated the game strategies and outcomes of each participant using the system dynamics approach to reveal the long-term strategy evolution mechanism of the core participants in the vertical integration of EHRs in the medical consortium, as well as the influencing factors and action mechanisms of each party’s strategy evolution to provide references for improving relevant policies. RESULTS The evolutionary game system could eventually reach an optimal equilibrium, but in areas where the government was required to be in a dominant position, patient supervision was necessary to have a positive role, while a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism can promote active participation of hospitals. CONCLUSIONS The effective way to achieve the goal of vertical integration of EHRs in the medical consortium is to build a multiagent coordination mechanism under the guidance of the government. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish a scientific integration performance evaluation mechanism, a reward and punishment mechanism, and a benefit distribution mechanism to promote the healthy development of vertical integration of EHRs in medical consortiums.