“Lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets” (referred to as the “Two Mountains Theory”) plays an important role in the process of controlling environmental pollution. This article introduces this practice with an example of pollution control in the Lancang-Mekong River Basin (LMRB). The research considers that the upstream and downstream countries can carry out water pollution control by imposing fines on enterprises that cause ecological damage and investing in pollution control resources. Firstly, the differential game model of pollution control by individual countries and international cooperation is established. Then, a differential game model of joint pollution control with compensation mechanism is established under the cooperation framework. Finally, the feedback Nash equilibrium of each state is obtained. The study shows that in the process of industrial pollution control by countries in the LMRB alone, due to the one-way externality of water pollution control, the more downstream countries are, the more resources will be invested in pollution control and the fewer fines will be imposed on enterprises that cause ecological damage. At the beginning stage of management, if more pollution control resources are input, fewer countries will participate in cooperation, and the fines for polluting enterprise would be less. When the amount of fines for enterprises is relatively small, the establishment of a river pollution compensation mechanism is not conducive to the input of pollution control resources. On the contrary, it is beneficial for the state to invest in pollution control resources. The coordinated development of economic development and ecological civilization construction is the core purpose of the “Two Mountains Theory”. Therefore, the case of the LMRB fully illustrates the feasibility of the “Two Mountains Theory” based on cooperation.

Currently, the Chinese government is promoting the transformation of clean energy in rural areas to reduce the consumption of coal to cope with the smog. It is mainly based on “coal to gas”. The development of biomass resources in agricultural areas is an alternative means of energy supply. In order to improve rural energy structure, we propose to upgrade “coal to gas” to “coal to biomass” derived from centralized biogas production (CBP) and straw-briquetting fuel (SBF). This study deals with the question of financing such projects. The public–private partnership (PPP) model is seen as a response that can mobilize social capital to finance investments in these new modes of production and energy supply in rural areas. Based on an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of the two projects considered above, an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) was carried out with the assistance of experts in order to clarify the strategic choices which are more suitable for investors. First, we built a PPP strategic-decision model. The decision model was divided into four strategies (pioneering strategy, struggling strategy, conservative strategy and striving strategy) and two development intensities (conservative and proactive). We used this method to construct a SWOT–AHP model of the PPP strategy for CBP and SBF based on the investigation from the experts. The strategic-decision model identified that a pioneering strategy based on opportunity type is promised for SBF, while a more aggressive type strategy in struggling strategy is essential for the CBP. In order to encourage investors to adopt a positive and optimistic attitude towards the two projects, the public authorities have a role of guidance to ensure the mobilization of the social capital necessary for the construction of the projects.

This paper takes the centralized biogas production project in the energy utilization of straw as a hypothetical item in investigation to discuss the straw collection mode based on the wishes of farmers. Through surveys of farmers in Shandong and Hebei provinces, under the current straw collection price, we found that 85% of farmers have the willingness to actively collect and transport straw, and the longest distance for active transportation is 3.22 km. The willingness of farmers to actively transport is not only affected by personal characteristics, family characteristics, and current energy consumption habits, but also the characteristics of behavioral intervention variables such as knowledge, attitude, and practice of environmental protection also significantly affect the distance of farmers’ active transportation. The behavioral intervention variables of these non-economic factors can be interfered and improved through multiple conventional propaganda tools. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a collection and storage point construction model based on the willingness of farmers to realize the transformation of the straw collection model from passive to active. This method also has an important reference value for most straw energy utilization projects. It will have an important impact on the planning, design, and operation of the project.