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Drawing attention to the wider literature on the linkages between civic engagement and democracy, this paper starts off by asking the question whether civic engagement beyond formal politics actually serves to strengthen democracy in Indonesia. Noting a contradiction between the literature that proposes that high associational density fosters democracy and recent analysis that highlights that political opportunity structures in Indonesia are unfavourable to popular representation and participation, the paper draws attention to a largely underexplored field within Indonesian democracy studies, namely that of mobilisation and participation by marginalised groups. The paper discusses and analyses strategies for bottom-up mobilisation, specifically the development planning programmes of Musrenbang, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), and Indonesian labour organising. The analysis focuses on the democratising aspects of these sectors, arguing that participation and mobilisation lacks the necessary popular foundations as well as organisational capacities that are necessary for participatory

This article presents an alternative theoretical framework to account for the political transition in Indonesia in 1998. Challenging the mainstream literature, which focuses on the presumed significance of civil society, the article claims that so-called democratization in Indonesia offered a mechanism through which to reorganize the distribution of patronage within the state. The transition was caused not by assertive civil society but Suharto's excessive centralization of patronage networks, which had the effect of alienating a significant proportion of the regime elite. Against this backdrop, democratization facilitated a decentralization of previously centralized patronage networks and a redistribution of spoils within the state towards elites that had been excluded from Suharto's inner circle.

ABSTRACT:The fracture behavior of poly(vinyl chloride) filled with ground calcium carbonate particles during a tensile test was studied. The particles were prepared by crushing natural raw crystalline limestone. For this purpose, 10 -50 parts of the particles having two different mean sizes (2 and 8 m) without further surface treatment were mixed with 100 parts of poly(vinyl chloride) and 3 parts of lead stearate as a stabilizer using a mixing roll. A tensile test was carried out using a dumbbell specimen. As a result, the yield stress decreased with increase in the particle content; however, there was no significant influence of particle size. From scanning electron microscopic observations of the specimen's surfaces during the tensile test, it was found that the particle/matrix interfaces were delaminated and formed voids around the particles when the applied stress approached the yield stress, that is, the particles acted as voids and the matrix around the voids was plastically deformed effectively. These observations appear to be the reason for the decrease of yield stress by the incorporation of the particles.

This article presents a counterpoint to the popular portrayals of political transitions in the Philippines and Indonesia as 'people power' driven by civil society mobilisation. Inherent in this kind of analysis is the popular assumption that transitions from sultanistic regimes are likely to be driven almost completely by forces outside of the regime, as they do not allow for independent actors or institutions that could peacefully arrange for transition 'from within'. This article suggests that, despite the appearance of a 'people power' revolution, the key driver behind the fall of the Marcos and Suharto regimes was forces internal to the regimes. Sultanistic regimes could collapse not only as a result of society-led displacement; sultanistic rulers could also be brought down by an alliance of moderate opposition elites and regime soft-liners, which opens up the way for a much less revolutionary path out of sultanism. More importantly, this article suggests that these elites emerged as a result of their growing marginalisation in the patronage system. Their challenge to the sultan was motivated less by strong democratic conviction than by desire to gain greater access to state patronage.