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Although the application of digital technology has long been considered to be an important and integral trend in human resource management (HRM), emerging evidence hints that digital HRM systems may not always work well in practice, and increasing research suggests that the adoption of digital HRM systems might have negative effects on organizations. In this article, we investigate whether a match in the levels of internal consistency exhibited by a digital HRM system and an original high‐performance work system (HPWS), i.e. congruence, impacts firms' data‐driven insight generation. We find that congruence between the digital HRM system and the original HPWS has a negative impact on firms' capability to generate data‐driven insights. Furthermore, organizations with high levels of internal consistency in both the digital and the original non‐digital HRM systems (i.e. high–high congruence) exhibit better data‐driven insight generation than organizations with low levels of internal consistency in both systems (i.e. low–low congruence). The results also reveal that the effect of congruence negatively influences firm financial performance and mediated by data‐driven insight generation. We discuss the implications of this study and call for future research to consider the characteristics of digital HRM systems and the original traditional HRM systems simultaneously.

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In today’s dynamic economic environment, enterprises must maintain sensitivity and flexibility when responding to the market through continuous strategic change. Anchored in the approach–inhibition theory of power, this study explores the relationship between CEO power and corporate strategic change and examines the moderating effects of company underperformance and product market competition. The study uses data from all A-share listed companies in China during 2006–2017. The results indicate that first, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and corporate strategic change. Appropriate centralization of CEO power helps promote corporate strategic change, whereas excessive centralization hinders strategic change. Second, low underperformance strengthens the inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and strategic change. Finally, high product market competition strengthens the inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO power and strategic change.