The emergence of robotic technologies has made a significant contribution in industry. Robot Operating System (ROS) is becoming a standard framework for industrial systems uses as a middleware system with many versions. However, the initial design of ROS does not include cyber-security concepts. The intense interest in robot systems, the security concerns and vulnerabilities of these systems have started to attract the attention of attackers. One of these attacks is DoS attack that targeting system availability by slowing down or crashing a service rather than obtaining the information or system. In this study, the impact of DoS attack has been analyzed in various scenarios for both in application and transport layer of the ROS middleware. In the experiments four different volume of DoS attacks are performed in five different experiment scenarios on ROS. To understand the impact of DoS attack, network traffics are monitored using Wireshark. The resulting effects measured with some Quality of Service parameters that are delay and packet loss.

Robotic systems are widely used in industry, agriculture, the inspection of infrastructure, and even in our daily lives. The safety and security of robotic systems have become a primary concern as their interaction with humans increases. In this context, attacks on robotic systems have increased for diversified field applications. It is necessary to accurately detect these abnormal events in these systems as soon as possible. However, these systems also need a runtime verification approach on whether they conform to the established specifications. In this study, runtime verification for anomaly detection methods is proposed for the security of the robot operating system (ROS). Firstly, an anomaly detection method is proposed to detect unexpected situations, such as the number of the received packages being decreased under DoS attacks. Then, a holistic runtime verification architecture is proposed for the anomaly detection method. This architecture consists of three major entities: a verification device, an attacker device, and a robotic platform without losing generality. In the verification device, ROSMonitoring and Oracle are used to implement runtime verification. The proposed architecture is verified through an experimental setup. It is shown that the architecture can be used for runtime verification of different anomaly detection algorithms. A discussion on the security of robotic systems is also presented.