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It is usually assumed that each cooperator contributes equally to different public pools in spatial public goods game. However, it is more reasonable to invest differently according to individual investment preference. In this paper, an extended public goods game, in which cooperators contribute to the groups according to the investment preference, is developed. The investment preference of a cooperator is characterized by the fraction of the cooperator from his/her own memory about a group and the intensity of investment preference is represented by a tunable parameter α. The well-mixed population and the structured population are analyzed under this mechanism. It is shown that the investment preference can give rise to coordination. Moreover, the extensive numerical simulation results show that with the increasing of investment preference density or memory length, the proportion of cooperation can increase monotonously. This is because the investment preference could help cooperators resist the invasion from defectors. Compared with the basic version, the new mechanism is able to promote cooperation effectively. Our research may provide a valuable insight for further exploring the nature of cooperation in the real world.

How long-term cooperation is maintained in a society is an important and interesting question. The evolutionary game theory is often used as the basic framework to study this topic. The social status of game participants has an important influence on individual decision-making. Enlightened by this thought, we present a classification imitation model where the mechanisms of the celebrity effect and incomplete egoism are presented. The celebrity effect is reflected in each strategy update process to probe how individual decision-making is dynamically adjusted by comparing the social status of both parties in the game. The incomplete egoism refers to the irrational imitation of celebrities while self-interest is ignored. With this model, the group cooperation decision-making mechanism led by celebrities is revealed. Large-scale Monte Carlo simulations show that the incomplete egoism of individuals cannot stimulate cooperation but guarantee the stable existence of cooperation. Furthermore, the scale-free and community structure of the network enables cooperation to spread widely and maintains long-term survival. Our conclusion might provide practically new insight into the understanding and controlling of cooperation in the complex social systems.

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