Evolution of digital money demonstrates that CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency means a digital form of traditional fiat currencies) design is really challenging. While technically possible CBDC solutions are visible, much of institutional aspects are rest to be unsolved. One of the issues is a degree of privacy and anonymity. All historical forms of money had intrinsic property of non-traceability of transactions and only now this feature of non-digital money is recognized as strong institutional advance. At the same time, privacy and anonymity preferences could relate to cultural attitudes. However, money may distort expected logical relations between such patterns like “less hierarchies more privacy-anonymity” or “more egalitarianism less privacy-anonymity”. This potentially means that money may posit extra propensity to privacy-anonymity that is going beyond the cultural attitudes. Basing on the survey, we demonstrate some contradictions in how respondents perceive the preference of functional usability over anonymity of transactions. The same is relevant when cultural patterns are taken into account. It is more likely to find cultural closeness across respondents from different regions than strong determinacy of privacy-anonymity preferences by propensity to hierarchies or egalitarianism. Additionally, we checked hierarchies or egalitarianism attitudes by additional questions and found some mixed results. Also, we found some conformism culture (meaning unstable preferences) and rely it with lack of trust in public institutions. When centralized money are less trusted people faster agree to sacrifice anonymity in the benefits of functionality. The main take away is that it is unlikely to expect the unity of optimal CBDC design across countries. Aside of behavioural distortions, culture still matter and it is likely to expect future variety of digital money from functional usability privacy-anonymity trade-off.

В 2001 р. премію за видатний внесок у розвиток економічних наук пам'яті Альфреда Нобеля присуджено двом американським науковцям-Т. Сардженту і К. Сімсу. Нагороду вручено "…за їхні емпіричні дослідження причинно-наслідкових зв'язків у макроекономіці". Робота нобелівських лауреатів стосується причинно-наслідкових зв'язків між економічною політикою та різними макроекономічними зміннимитакими, як: ВВП, інфляція, зайнятість та інвестиції.

The effectiveness of self-stimulating environmental regimes in unsteady economic systems is considered in the article on the basis of the conducted behavioral experiment. It is shown that rational choice, as a methodological basis is not always a sufficient prerequisite for the development of effective environmental regimes. It is substantiated that the initial level of well-being may determine the preferences of economic entities regarding environmental benefits. It is noted that in conditions of low priority of social welfare and ecology, at the individual level there is no reason to believe that collective actions to increase the supply of environmental goods will be successful. It is revealed that the potential for replication of altruistic strategies is rather weak, and they are almost entirely offset by rent-invading behavior, while collective actions do not generate a proper emergent order in which opportunistic behavior would be subject to more stringent restrictions. In general, the results of the experiment indicate an increase in the effect of the gap between the individual rational rent-invading choices and the collective result, which leads to the degradation of the environment, which accordingly calls into question the expediency of creating a decentralized mechanism for financing the benefit of «clean ecology» in Ukraine. It is substantiated that in the short term, the very tools of environmental policy that will be based on the use of individuals to benefit from the implementation of such a policy and pushing them out will be potentially successful. However, in the long run, the improvement of the situation in the field of environmental goods may be based on changes in preferences that are not always strictly determined by the level of income, in particular, environmental policy should be associated with those changes in institutional quality and education that would be relevant to changes in preferences.

Рассмотрены концептуальные подходы к моделированию поведения экономических субъектов и раскрыто понятие рациональности экономического выбора. Обосновано, что систематическое соответствие намерений и ожиданий, определяющих действия различных, взаимосвязанных индивидов, является основой формирования определённого институционального порядка. Сформулировано авторское видение феномена эмерджентного институционального порядка. Раскрыты результаты попытки подтверждения феномена эмерджентного институционального порядка в лабораторных условиях. Приведен пример возникновения эмерджентного институционального порядка в реальных экономических системах. Аргументирован вывод о том, что важные составляющие эмерджентного порядка, присутствующие в рыночных процессах, обусловлены влиянием институтом, а не одной лишь рациональностью индивидов. К л ю ч е в ы е с л о в а : рациональность, стратегическое взаимодействие, поведенческая теория игр, феномен эмерджентного институционального порядка. JEL: C7, C91, D01. Такой здесь был гражданский строй, Что благо нёс изъян любой...; Пороком улей был снедаем, Но в целом он являлся раем...; Тут и преступница-пчела Для пользы общества жила.