No abstract

No abstract

The current research investigates how prior preferences affect causal learning. Participants were tasked with repeatedly choosing policies (e.g., increase vs. decrease border security funding) in order to maximize the economic output of an imaginary country and inferred the influence of the policies on the economy. The task was challenging and ambiguous, allowing participants to interpret the relations between the policies and the economy in multiple ways. In three studies, we found evidence of motivated reasoning despite financial incentives for accuracy. For example, participants who believed that border security funding should be increased were more likely to conclude that increasing border security funding actually caused a better economy in the task. In Study 2, we hypothesized that having neutral preferences (e.g., preferring neither increased nor decreased spending on border security) would lead to more accurate assessments overall, compared to having a strong initial preference; however, we did not find evidence for such an effect. In Study 3, we tested whether providing participants with possible functional forms of the policies (e.g., the policy takes some time to work or initially has a negative influence but eventually a positive influence) would lead to a smaller influence of motivated reasoning but found little evidence for this effect. This research advances the field of causal learning by studying the role of prior preferences, and in doing so, integrates the fields of causal learning and motivated reasoning using a novel explore-exploit task.

No abstract

Over the course of training, physicians develop significant knowledge and expertise. We review dual-process theory, the dominant theory in explaining medical decision making: physicians use both heuristics from accumulated experience (System 1) and logical deduction (System 2). We then discuss how the accumulation of System 1 clinical experience can have both positive effects (e.g., quick and accurate pattern recognition) and negative ones (e.g., gaps and biases in knowledge from physicians’ idiosyncratic clinical experience). These idiosyncrasies, biases, and knowledge gaps indicate a need for individuals to engage in appropriate training and study to keep these cognitive skills current lest they decline over time. Indeed, we review converging evidence that physicians further out from training tend to perform worse on tests of medical knowledge and provide poorer patient care. This may reflect a variety of factors, such as specialization of a physician’s practice, but is likely to stem at least in part from cognitive factors. Acquired knowledge or skills gained may not always be readily accessible to physicians for a number of reasons, including an absence of study, cognitive changes with age, and the presence of other similar knowledge or skills that compete in what is brought to mind. Lastly, we discuss the cognitive challenges of keeping up with standards of care that continuously evolve over time.