Much recent literature has examined the correlates of anti-vaccination beliefs, without specifying the mechanism that creates adherence to these debunked ideas. We posit that anti-vaccination beliefs are an outcome of a general psychological propensity to believe in conspiracies based on new research on the interconnectedness of conspiracy beliefs. These ideas are tested with a confirmatory factor analysis and a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model of a nationally representative U.S. sample from the 2016 American National Election Studies. The confirmatory factor analysis shows that anti-vaccination beliefs highly correlate with belief in the unrelated conspiracies that Obama is a Muslim and 9/11 trutherism. Our SUR models also show that all three of these very different beliefs have similar predictors. All three have a negative correlation with political trust, political knowledge, education, and a positive correlation with authoritarianism. Thus, anti-vaccination beliefs are shown to be part of a psychological propensity to believe in conspiracies.

We examined whether symbolic racism is associated with anti-Black affect or more general anti-liberal affect. Across six studies (N = 14,078), we determined that symbolic racism is associated with more positive attitudes toward conservatives and more negative attitudes toward liberals, regardless of the target’s race. While high scorers on the symbolic racism scale show a slight preference for White vs. Black conservatives (d = .15) and White vs. Black liberals (d = .12), low scorers show a considerable preference for Black vs. White liberals (d = .42) and Black vs. White conservatives (d = .50). Lingering questions about the validity of the symbolic racism construct are justified on the basis that symbolic racism does not reliably measure anti-Black affect.

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In this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in order to evaluate whether his theory can be saved. Critics argue that Kant does not adequately distinguish between evil and mundane wrongdoing, making his use of the term ‘evil’ emotional hyperbole; by defining evil as the subordination of the moral law to self-love his analysis is seemingly overly simplistic and empirically false; and by focusing solely on the moral character of the perpetrator of evil, Kant’s theory apparently ignores the most salient aspect of evil – the suffering of victims. While I will not claim that Kant provides us with a fully adequate theory of evil, I respond to each of these criticisms and conclude that Kant’s theory can still provide significant insight into both the nature of evil and the moral psychology of perpetrators of evil.

What is the nature of evil action? My thesis is that perpetrators and victims of evil inhabit an asymmetrical relation of power; the strength of the more powerful party lies in its ability to exploit the other’s fundamental vulnerability, and the weaker party is vulnerable precisely insofar as it is directly dependent on the more powerful party for the satisfaction of its fundamental needs. The fundamental vulnerabilities that are exploited correspond to features essential to our humanity (ontological), moral personhood (personal), and individuality (characteristic). These kinds of vulnerabilities are both constituted by and engender fundamental needs and give rise to direct dependencies on others to satisfy or to refrain from interfering with the satisfaction of fundamental needs. The unambiguous exploitation by the more powerful agent on whom the vulnerable directly depend is characteristic of evil action. Although I do not claim that the exploitation of ontological, personal, and characteristic vulnerabilities necessarily results in evil, it does typify it.