''Contagion'' appears frequently in peer-reviewed articles and in popular media to explain the spread of ideas, feelings, and behaviors. In the context of social science, however, we argue that this metaphor leads to magical thinking and should be described as a simile, rather than a metaphor. We review literature on ''social contagion'' using the dialogical paradigm and conclude that peer-reviewed claims tend to correspond with imagined realities from epidemiology rather than social science, including assumptions of passive and linear microbial spread, as well as pathology. We explore case studies on the spread of laughter, riot behavior, and ''mass psychogenic illness,'' and find that social contagion involves social meanings negotiated at the level of persons and groups that are uncharacteristic to the spread of diseases. Dialogism is presented as a correction to the epidemiological paradigm.

Most humans believe in a god, but many do not. Differences in belief have profound societal impacts. Anthropological accounts implicate bottom-up perceptual processes in shaping religious belief, suggesting that individual differences in these processes may help explain variation in belief. Here, in findings replicated across socio-religiously disparate samples studied in the U.S. and Afghanistan, implicit learning of patterns/order within visuospatial sequences (IL-pat) in a strongly bottom-up paradigm predict 1) stronger belief in an intervening/ordering god, and 2) increased strength-of-belief from childhood to adulthood, controlling for explicit learning and parental belief. Consistent with research implicating IL-pat as a basis of intuition, and intuition as a basis of belief, mediation models support a hypothesized effect pathway whereby IL-pat leads to intuitions of order which, in turn, lead to belief in ordering gods. The universality and variability of human IL-pat may thus contribute to the global presence and variability of religious belief.

This chapter demonstrates the dynamism and utility of positioning theory, in the domain of social justice. The illustrative examples are drawn from international intergroup situations, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. These situations involve interpretations of rights and duties by different groups, rights and duties being central to positioning theory. The chapter critically explores the questions of whether there are universals in rights and duties, and whether people apply moral principles consistently across contexts. Both the traditional empirical research literature and positioning theory reveal that context has an important influence on moral thinking, including on the interpretation of rights and duties.

No abstract