This study uses newly disaggregated National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election data to revisit the theory that sectoral and regional shifts in economic activity contributed substantially to private-sector union decline in the United States. Unlike most studies, which focus on differential employment growth among union and non-union establishments, this article focuses on how such shifts may have affected organizational rates themselves. Improved data permit a shift-share decomposition that indicates that approximately 40% of the decline in union elections is in response to sectoral shifts, the majority attributable to changes within each sector. Moreover, in an update to Dickens and Leonard’s 1985 study, the author shows that declining organization rates since 1980 are responsible for a decline in union density of 5.4 percentage points.

We examine settings-such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war-in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may prefer Conflict ex ante if there are sufficient asymmetries in strength. There are two sources of this finding. First, up-front investments are more dissimilar between players under Conflict, and they are lower than under Bargaining when one player is much stronger than the other. Second, the probability of the stronger player winning in Conflict is higher than the share received under Nash bargaining. We thus provide a rationale for conflict to occur under complete information that does not depend on long-term commitment problems. Greater balance in institutional support for different sides is more likely to maintain peace and settlements.

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Why has private sector union participation fallen away so much in the United States since the late 1950s? Featuring an improved dataset on National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections, I present evidence that import penetration accounts for approximately 40 percent of the decline in union formation for U.S. manufacturing. This estimate translates to 4.6 percent of the decline in private sector union density. The effect is driven by trade with low-income countries and, to some extent, other high-income countries. China is not a factor early on, but their strong import growth since 2000 can account for about 12 percentage points of the total decline.