This thesis contributes to a new literature that addresses sectarianism in non-sectarian contexts. It examines the reasons behind sectarian sentiments in Jordan by looking at three important political actors: the regime, Quietist-Salafis, and Salafi-Jihadis. It argues that primordial and instrumentalist explanations of sectarianism cannot account for sectarian expressions by the regime and Quietist Salafis. It therefore deploys a constructivist-realist approach to explain the sectarianism of these two political actors. Expressions of Shia wariness by the regime are motivated by fears of intervention in domestic politics by Iran and its proxies, and a fear of sectarian spill-over effects. These expressions are also determined by the regime’s bandwagoning with Saudi Arabia and the United States for economic and strategic reasons. Some radicalized Jordanians have also played a sectarianizing role and implicated the state in sectarian measures. A constructivist-realist approach suggests that the sectarianism of Jordan’s Quietist-Salafi community is motivated by political self preservation and a desire to win intra-Sunni Islamist political battles over the regime’s favor. By contrast, Salafi-Jihadi sectarianism in Jordan is ideologically motivated and is therefore explained by primordial approaches. The Jordanian experience suggests that sectarianism can paradoxically emerge in homogenous societies for political rather than primordial reasons, that Islamist groups deploy sectarianism for very different purposes, and, finally, that only a theoretically eclectic approach can explain the array of reasons why these groups weaponize sectarianism.