Some philosophical theories of the nature of colour aim to respect a ‘common sense’ conception of colour: aligning with the common sense conception is supposed to speak in favour of a theory and conflicting with it is supposed to speak against a theory. This chapter argues that the idea of a ‘common sense’ conception of colour that philosophers of colour have relied upon is overly simplistic. By drawing on experimental and historical evidence, it demonstrates how conceptions of colour vary along several dimensions and how even supposedly ‘core’ components of the contemporary ‘common sense’ conception of colour are less stable than previously thought.

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The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) is the claim that the mind can and does extend beyond the human body. Adams and Aizawa (A&A) contend that arguments for EMH commit a ‘coupling constitution fallacy’. We deny that the master argument for EMH commits such a fallacy. But we think that there is an important question lurking behind A&A's allegation: under what conditions is cognition spread across a tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions from Haugeland, we contend that the system must exhibit a distinctive sort of semantic activity, semantic activity that the system as a whole takes responsibility for.

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