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Environmental pollution abatement is a complex project. A system dynamics (SD) model is built for studying a mixed-strategy evolutionary game between the government that manages environmental pollution and the firm that generates contamination during their production processes. The stability analysis and SD simulation results show that evolutionary equilibrium (EE) does not exist with a static penalty. Therefore, a dynamic penalty is suggested in the SD model for equilibrium stabilisation and improvement in environmental pollution. Furthermore, a restraining penalty is found, which can not only stabilise the evolutional processes but also ideally influence the environmental pollution control in the simulation result. The stability analysis of the evolutionary game with both the dynamic penalties proves that Nash equilibrium takes the role of EE. The SD model can connect the static concept with dynamic predictions in the evolutionary game theory in a visual and convenient way.

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In this paper the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge project is taken as a case to analyze supplier development in infrastructure mega-projects. Compared with manufacturing industry, the characteristics of supplier development in infrastructure mega-projects is analyzed in term of development motives, supplier selection, quality management, production mode, owner participation and risks. The critical factors influencing the construction supplier development are identified, which include incentives, collaboration, future market, trust and bilateral communication. Furthermore, focusing on the incentives for the supplier's product quality and production capacity improvement, decision-making framework models are proposed to design the incentive mechanisms.