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The global trend in common-pool resource (CPR) governance is to decentralize resource use management to local user groups. Since the survival and sustainability of self-governing organizations are closely linked to the satisfaction of its members, listening to users who have the largest stake in CPR sustainability is crucial. The literature on CPR governance has two shortcomings: its analyses are restricted to the local community, excluding higher institutional and government levels; and power asymmetry among users is neglected, even though it can undermine collective action and hinder effective CPR management. In this study, multiple governance levels were linked, and the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) frameworkwhich contextualizes how interactions among local actors lead to institutional outcomes that shape both individual and collective actionswas extended by controlling for the impact of power relations on institutional performance. The outcomes of irrigation management decentralization were assessed via three case studies on locally managed irrigation institutions from two provinces in Turkey. It was found that power asymmetries have a significant impact on user satisfaction across the cases, albeit in different directions. The implication of this finding is that, in contexts where land distribution is highly unequal, inequalities may have contradictory effects depending on how power operates and is reflected in CPR management.able to effectively manage common-pool resources (CPRs). In particular, the high operation and maintenance costs of CPR management caused financial problems that resulted in the collapse of topdown, centrally planned and managed systems (Meinzen-Dick, 2007). As an alternative to the prevailing

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