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The International Law Commission (ILC) temporarily adopted Draft Article 7 on immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, listing six international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity that state officials don't share immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction. This paper holds a conservative attitude to the adoption of Draft Article 7 after combing international and national practice and research on immunity theory. First, by sorting out international practices and national practices, it could be drawn that the exception to immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction has not yet formed customary international law. Second, through the analysis of the theory and practices, it could be found that the theory for supporting international crimes as exceptions to the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction: international crimes should not be recognized as official acts, the effectiveness of jus cogens is higher than the immunity rule and the theory of impunity against international crimes are not sufficient. Based on the above results, this paper argues that the ILC should not make clarifying immunity exceptions the core of its work on this topic; instead, it should focus on further clarifying the rules for granting state officials immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction to respect the principle of sovereign equality of states and maintain the stability of international relations.

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The jurisdictional immunity of international organizations is a necessity for them to independently perform their functions and achieve their purposes. Therefore, the international community generally grants absolute jurisdictional immunity to international organizations. China has always advocated the position of absolute jurisdictional immunity, however, in the AIIB Agreement and the Headquarters Agreement between China and AIIB, China turn to the view that AIIB only share restrictive jurisdictional immunity. The change of China’s opinion on AIIB is not only the result of the development of international organizations immunity, but also the result of AIIB’s functional necessity. The fact that AIIB only enjoys restrictive jurisdictional immunity in China makes AIIB possible to be sued in China’s domestic courts. If the eligible plaintiff bring a lawsuit against AIIB in China, the courts could handle the case in accordance with domestic laws, the AIIB Agreement and the Headquarters Agreement to alleviate the dilemma of China’s lack of international organization law.