No abstract

Recent evolutionary economic geography studies have argued that regional diversification emerges as a path‐dependent process, as regions often branch into industries that are related to its industrial structure. However, it is less clear who are creating new industries and under what regional conditions. This research seeks to fill this gap and identify “new industry creators” in regional industrial diversification. We differentiate two types of new industry formation—path‐breaking and path‐dependent—and examine whether some new industry creators are more path‐breaking than others, by incorporating two factors that have been largely overlooked in recent literature on technological relatedness—firm heterogeneity and regional institutions. Based on a firm‐level data set of China’s manufacturing industries, this paper shows that path‐breaking and path‐dependence coexist. Empirical results confirm that firm heterogeneity and regional institutions not only affect the firms’ capabilities in creating new industries, but also encourage/discourage firms to be adventurous and path‐breaking. This research implies that lagging regions can catch up with developed regions by coordinating regional resources and adjusting local institutional arrangements to attract more path‐breaking firms.

By analysing the development and operation of local government bonds (LGBs), a new tool fashioned by the Chinese government to finance infrastructure projects, this article improves the understanding of the political economy of China's local debt. We find that the central government uses LGBs to intervene in local debt and pursue policy objectives, and designs a quota system to decide the bond issuing amount and the project selection. When calculating quotas, the central government prioritizes limiting financial risk and achieving national development goals. Local debt should match the fiscal capacity of local governments, and the projects should contribute to the sectors emphasized by the central government as important for national development, reflecting the centralization of central–local relations. However, LGBs hardly fix the problem of local debt, and the pressure to maintain economic growth by expanding infrastructure investment has pushed local debt to an alarming level.

Local government bonds (LGBs) have become the most important tool of the Chinese state for financing infrastructure projects. The underwriters and investors in LGBs are mostly commercial banks, with state actors holding the overwhelming majority of shares. We call these state-controlled market actors. This article investigates the role of state-controlled market actors in LGB issuance to extend the understanding of state actors and state–market relations in the financialisation of urban governance. The findings show that they underwrite and invest in LGBs to support the government's development objectives and make profits. They can hardly affect the government to create the terms and conditions of bonds to favour their financial interests, but they manage to make substantial profits. They follow the policy trends to identify LGBs as risk-free and reflexively change their investment priority towards the bonds. Due to the low interest rates, the banks mainly profit from bond trading in the secondary market and fiscal fund investment. There are preferential policies for LGB trading in the secondary market, and local governments deposit fiscal funds in the banks to motivate them to do LGB business. We argue that reflexively making investment decisions according to the policy environment and making profits by exploiting political resources represented by preferential policies and fiscal funds show the adaptability of the state-controlled market actors.

In China, state-led financialisation through local government financing platforms resulted in a surge in local government debt. To manage financial risk, the central state introduced local government bonds (LGBs) to replace the platforms as the main financing source for infrastructure investment. The issuance of LGBs is subject to a budgetary process. We argue that LGBs mark a turn to state de-financialisation, as the local state’s financial logic of maximising value extraction from the built environment is restricted by budgetary control. Through developing a database of LGB issuance in over 400 prefectural cities, this article reveals that local indebtedness determines the geographies of bond issuance, confirming the effect of the central state’s objective of restricting local government debt. The dynamics of state-led financialisation change from the inter-jurisdictional competition in infrastructure investment among local states through local government financing platforms to a hierarchical control of LGB issuance led by the central state using the budget. Our findings show that financial expansion may mean state de-financialisation and fiscal resources are not only used to promote state-led financialisation but also to enable state de-financialisation.