What conditions precipitate militia-inflicted sexual violence during counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization operations? Bringing insights from the outsourcing and social cohesion theses, we expand on the sexual violence as practice framework by focusing on the issue of commander's tolerance. Given the principal-agent problem, tolerance can be conceptualized and refined as a form of implicit order. Prioritizing the relationship between government and militia groups, we argue that militia-inflicted sexual violence is amplified by two interrelated conditionsthe link to (or association with) the government security forces and the autonomy permitted to the militias to act independently in maintaining control in conflict zones. As such, sexual violence-as-weapons of war logic can be extended to understand the finer variations of militia-committed violence in COIN operations. We elaborate our explanations by analyzing three peripheral operations conducted by Indonesian security forces and the associated militias: East Timor, Aceh and West Papua. We process-trace the mechanisms through which the two conditions of linkage and autonomy permit progovernment militia groups to commit mass civilian killing and sexual violence. In the final section, we conclude with broad policy implications from our research.

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