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The IP address consumption and the global routing table size are two of the vital parameters of the Internet growth. In this paper we quantitatively characterize the IPv4 address allocations made over the past six years and the global BGP routing table size changes during the same period of time. About 63,000 address blocks have been allocated since the beginning of the Internet, of which about 18,000 address blocks were allocated during our study period, from November 1997 to August 2004. Among these 18,000 allocations, 90% of them started being announced into the BGP routing table within 75 days after the allocation, while 8% of them has not been used up to now. Among all the address blocks that have ever been used, 45% of them were split into fragments smaller than the original allocated blocks; without these fragmentations, the current BGP table would have been about half of its current size. Furthermore, we found that the evolution of BGP routing table consists of both the appearance of new prefixes and the disappearance of old prefixes. While the change of the BGP routing table size only reflects the combined results of the two processes, the dynamics of either process is much higher than that of the BGP table size. Finally, we classify routing prefixes into covering and covered ones, and examine their evolution separately. For the covered prefixes, which account for almost half of the BGP table size, we infer their practical motives such as multihoming, load balancing, and traffic engineering, etc., via a classification method.

During the past twenty years the Domain Name System (DNS) has sustained phenomenal growth while maintaining satisfactory performance. However, the original design focused mainly on system robustness against physical failures, and neglected the impact of operational errors such as misconfigurations. Our recent measurement effort revealed three specific types of misconfigurations in DNS today: lame delegation, diminished server redundancy, and cyclic zone dependency. Zones with configuration errors suffer from reduced availability and increased query delays up to an order of magnitude. Furthermore, while the original DNS design assumed that redundant DNS servers fail independently, our measurements show that operational choices made at individual zones can severely affect the availability of other zones. We found that, left unchecked, DNS configuration errors are widespread, with lame delegation affecting 15% of the DNS zones, diminished server redundancy being even more prevalent, and cyclic dependency appearing in 2% of the zones. We also noted that the degrees of misconfiguration vary from zone to zone, with most popular zones having the lowest percentage of errors. Our results indicate that DNS, as well as any other truly robust large-scale system, must include systematic checking mechanisms to cope with operational errors.

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