Metacognition refers to the ability to be aware of one’s own cognition. Ample evidence indicates that metacognition in the human primate is highly dissociable from cognition, specialized across domains, and subserved by distinct neural substrates. However, these aspects remain relatively understudied in macaque monkeys. In the present study, we investigated the functionality of macaque metacognition by combining a confidence proxy, hierarchical Bayesian meta-d′ computational modelling, and a single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation technique. We found that Brodmann area 46d (BA46d) played a critical role in supporting metacognition independent of task performance; we also found that the critical role of this region in meta-calculation was time-sensitive. Additionally, we report that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage.

Metacognition refers to the ability to be aware of one’s own cognition. Ample evidence indicate that metacognition in the human primate is highly dissociable from cognition, specialized across domains, and subserved by distinct neural substrates. However, these aspects remain relatively understudied in the macaque monkeys. Here we investigated the functionality of macaques’ metacognition by combining a confidence proxy, hierarchical Bayesian meta-d’ computational modelling, and single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation technique. We found a critical role of Brodmann Area 46d (BA 46d) in supporting metacognition without implicating task performance and its critical time-sensitive role in meta-calculation. We additionally revealed that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage.