This article makes two major claims. The first is that independent Botswana was able to generate and sustain a type of developmental state because of the presence of an indigenous initiator state culture that was preserved by the Protectorate state and was inherited by the post-colonial state elites. The second is that the non-emergence of the developmental state in post-colonial Zimbabwe is explained by the presence of a non-initiator indigenous state culture which was preserved by the Rhodesian colonial state and was inherited by the post-colonial state elites. The article briefly reviews the literature, analyses the Tswana and Shona pre-colonial state cultures, and shows that these were preserved by the colonial states and inherited by the nationalist politicians.

State/civil society interaction in Botswana displays patterns characterised by mutual criticism in each other's presence, the willingness of state officials to meet and exchange views with non-state leaders, and the media's role of reminding the contestants to meet and exchange views. The Botswana political culture compels/constrains contestants to meet and exchange views rather than to disengage and resort to the trading of unpleasant remarks in the media and to industrial action on the street. The theoretical implication is that political culture vitally shapes state/civil society interaction and should not be ignored by researchers who seek to define/characterise strong/weak civil societies.

Did Southern African states have the developmental focus to make their countries rich? My hypothesis is that a clear focus on making the country rich (with networked infrastructure, effective and functioning technology, functioning health and educational systems, high national income, diversified economy) would dictate that the priorities of the state be ordered in a certain way. My argument is that most Southern African states were historically not properly focused on making their countries rich. My other argument is that most of them are slowly shifting their focus towards making their countries rich.

This paper explores the idea that poor governance explains the rise of separatist nationalism in situations such as Zambia, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia (in Africa) that had previously been independently governed during the colonial times, but later joined other states at independence to enjoy normal politics, but later degenerated into violent separatist nationalism. Our argument is that centralisation of power in an environment in which cultural groups are calling for regional autonomy, for even development, and for the international community to intervene on the side of peace, create grounds that explain the rise of violent separatist movements. The Barotseland Protectorate negotiated for autonomous development and, after securing constitutional guarantees in its favour, voluntarily joined Zambia in what was expected to be a one nation, two states system. After four decades of resisting constitutional amendments in favour of the centralisation of power, the Barotse of Zambia abandoned the politics of autonomous development and started calling for a separate state. Their resolve to remain peaceful is not aided by the international community that is reluctant to intervene, exposing the political process to radicals who consider violence as an alternative. The paper argues that violent separatist politics is preventable.

This article seeks to explain the pivotal role that Botswana played in the light of the Zimbabwe political crisis after the 2008 election. It argues that Botswana was able to apply pivotal deterrence in Zimbabwe between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) that claimed to have won the March 2008 presidential election and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF) that claimed to have won the June 2008 presidential re-run election in which Robert Mugabe stood alone. This article deploys the theory of 'pivotal deterrence' to investigate the influence that Botswana had over the MDC and ZANU PF.