We consider two competing firms that sell two quality‐differentiated products over two periods, in which the high‐ or low‐quality firms have the option to act as a pricing leader or follower in the first or second periods. Two groups of consumers make their purchase decisions in the first or second periods, with the former consumers using the experience available to the latter from online communities (e.g., TikTok). Our analysis indicates that competition intensity and consumers' reviews are two interacting forces that steer the equilibrium decisions of the two competing firms.

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This study considers a supply chain consists of one manufacturer produces a product with a quality level and sells it through one retailer. A stylized model is developed to investigate the impacts of consumers' privacy concerns on pricing, quality decisions, and profitability through the relationship between product quality and personal information. When consumers' privacy concern is considered, the product quality level, the wholesale price, the payoffs of the manufacturer and retailer, and consumer surplus decrease with the personal information loss, whereas the selling price increases if this loss is low. Our results also show that the retailer prefers to charge a high selling price if the information benefit and the personal information loss are low, or the information benefit is relatively high. Moreover, a "win-win-win" outcome can be achieved among the manufacturer, retailer, and consumers if the personal information loss is sufficiently low. In the case of quality-differentiated products, however, although the manufacturer improves the product quality level, the wholesale prices are increased if the information benefit and the personal information loss are low, or the information benefit is high.</p>