Using a hand‐collected data set of Chinese reverse mergers (RM) between 2006 and 2015, we find that financial constraints are more serious and investment thirst higher for RM companies as compared with initial public offering (IPO) companies. For state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), listing via a RM or an IPO does not impact the level of financial constraints post‐listing, while SOE RMs have higher investment thirst than SOE IPOs. By contrast, non‐SOE RMs are under more financial constraints and have higher investment thirst than non‐SOE IPOs. These differences are not presented during the 4 Trillion Yuan stimulus period between 2008 and 2010.

<p>Corporate dividend policy should strike a balance between paying cash to shareholders when there are excess resources and retaining sufficient resources in the company to fund worthwhile projects. Using excess resources to pay dividends can help to avoid overinvestment by the company in inappropriate projects and/or other potential misuse of funds by managers for their own benefit. However, companies also need to avoid paying too much in dividends to ensure that adequate resources are available within the company to fund projects that could increase shareholder wealth (i.e., to avoid underinvestment). Cross-listing of company shares can improve governance and oversight, which may make the dividend policies of cross-listed companies more likely to avoid both over and underinvestment.</p> <p>Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2011, we find that cross-listed companies pay higher dividends than non-cross-listed companies when there are excess resources (measured by free cash flow), thereby reducing the potential for overinvestment/misuse of the resources by cross-listed companies. We also find that the dividends of cross-listed companies are lower than those of non-cross-listed companies when there are greater growth opportunities (measure by the market-to-book ratio), reflecting the reduced potential for underinvestment by cross-listed companies. We find more limited evidence that cross-listings may influence the relationship between dividend volatility and free cash flow and growth opportunities. Overall, our results suggest that companies cross-listing their shares have dividend policies that are more responsive than those of non-cross-listed companies to potential shareholder concerns about over and underinvestment.</p>

We investigate the relationship between the intensity of share pledging activities and the level of financial constraint in publicly listed firms in China. We show that the high financial constraint level may motivate insiders to use share pledging as an alternative funding source and an expropriation mechanism. Although overall share collateralisation can cause a subsequently more constrained financing condition, we find evidence that share pledging made by the controlling shareholder is likely to mitigate financial constraints in the following year. Our findings are robust to alternative measures and an instrumental variable for dealing with endogeneity problems.

We investigate the relationship between cross‐listings and dividend policy. We find that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower and more stable dividends than their non‐cross‐listed peers, and that dividends become more stable the longer a company has been cross‐listed. We also find the strength of the cross‐listing/dividend policy relationship varies based on the market where the shares are cross‐listed. The strength of the relationship varies from B‐shares (least strong) to Hong Kong shares (stronger) to American Depository Receipts (strongest). Our results indicate cross‐listings may influence both dividend size and stability, and that this influence can vary by the type of cross‐listing.

This chapter provides an analysis of companies undertaking a reverse merger (RM) as opposed to an initial public offering (IPO) on Chinese stock markets. It introduces a new data set of RMs on Chinese exchanges to examine the financial characteristics of firms that choose an RM over an IPO. The authors find that Chinese RM firms have lower liquidity, higher leverage, and lower asset turnover than firms that go public through an IPO. Promoters of Chinese RM firms also hold more shares as compared with IPOs. Finally, Chinese RM firms have higher return on assets and lower underpricing at listing. The results identify several characteristics of Chinese RM firms that differentiate them from firms that go public via an RM in Western markets, suggesting that Chinese institutions and stage of stock market development may impact the decision to go public.