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Purpose: An electronic product recycling not only needs the waste treatment company, but also involves recycler and remanufacturer. It is significance for increasing subsidy modes and promoting waste recycling to research the effect of government subsidies for recycler and remanufacturer on the equilibrium of closed-loop supply chain.Design/methodology/approach: In view of service competition, we build a Stackelberg model which contains an original manufacturer, a recycler and remanufacturer and further obtain the equilibrium decision of closed-loop supply chain. Based on this strategy model, we analyze how two different subsidies to utilization rate of raw materials, the service level and the demand of product affect on the terminal decision. Findings:We compared the two different subsidy ways in closed-loop supply chain. Subsidy to utilization rate of raw materials has no effect on the whole market demand for electronic product; and subsidy on utilization rate of raw materials has no effect on the whole market demand for electronic product. Research implications:Under the conditions in which government can observe the information of raw material utility and remanufacturing service level, if government decides to -1061-Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management -http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1149 expand the market size, it could subsidize remanufacturer for different service level; Under the conditions in which government can observe the information of raw material utility and remanufacturing service level, if government want to improve utilization rate of raw materials, stimulate sustainable development of industries of electronic product, it can subsidizes recycler based on different utilization rate of raw materials. Originality/value:We analyzed the closed-loop supply chain equilibrium, compared the effects on it under different subsidy mechanism and offered some advises in order to provide scientific support to promote electronic products recycling.

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<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies the optimal portfolio selection for defined contribution (DC) pension fund with mispricing. We adopt the general hyperbolic absolute risk averse (HARA) utility to describe the risk performance of the pension fund managers. The financial market comprises a risk-free asset, a pair of mispriced stocks, and the market index. Using the dynamic programming approach, we construct the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and obtain the explicit expressions for optimal portfolio choices with two methods. Finally, numerical analysis is presented to illustrate the sensitivity of the optimal portfolios to parameters of the financial market and contribution process. <b>200</b> words.</p>

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