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European environmental governance has radically transformed over the past two decades. While traditionally enforcement of environmental law has been the responsibility of public authorities (public authorities of the EU Member States, themselves policed by the European Commission), this paradigm has now taken a democratic turn. Led by changes in international environmental law and in particular the UNECE Aarhus Convention (UNECE, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention (1998). Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention), signed on June 25, 1998.), EU law now gives important legal rights to members of the public and environmental non-governmental organisations (“ENGOs”) to become involved in environmental governance, by means of accessing environmental information, participating in environmental decision-making and bringing legal proceedings. While doctrinal legal and regulatory scholarship on this embrace of “bottom-up” private environmental governance is now substantial, there has been relatively little quantitative research in the field. This article represents a first step in mapping this evolution of environmental governance laws in the EU. We employ a leximetrics methodology, coding over 6000 environmental governance laws from three levels of legal sources (international, EU and national), to provide the first systematic data showing the transformation of European environmental governance regimes. We develop the Nature Governance Index (“NGI”) to measure how the enforcement tools deployed in international, EU and national law have changed over time, from the birth of the EU’s flagship nature conservation law, the 1992 Habitats Directive (Directive 92/43/EEC). At the national level, we focus on three EU Member States (France, Ireland and the Netherlands) to enable a fine-grained measurement of the changes in national nature governance laws over time. This article introduces our unique datasets and the NGI, describes the process used to collect the datasets and its limitations, and compares the evolution in laws at the international, EU and national levels over the 23-year period from 1992–2015. Our findings provide strong empirical confirmation of the democratic turn in European environmental governance, while revealing the significant divergences between legal systems that remain absent express harmonisation of the Aarhus Convention’s principles in EU law. Our data also set the foundations for future quantitative legal research, enabling deeper analysis of the relationships between the different levels of multilevel environmental governance.

In the battle to address Europe’s biodiversity crisis, fixing its implementation gap—the gap between EU nature law on the books, and on the ground—is vital. Europe’s private nature governance revolution, underpinned by the UNECE Aarhus Convention, is a core part of its response. This article breaks new empirical ground in understanding how those mechanisms have been working in practice, and their knock-on effects for traditional enforcement by the State. We develop an innovative methodological tool, the Nature Governance Effectiveness Indicators (“NGEIs”), enabling the first quantitative measurement of the effectiveness of public and private nature governance in practice. In collecting data on these indicators, we create a novel dataset spanning three jurisdictions and 23 years, giving a unique insight into Europe’s “environmental democracy in action”. We regress the NGEIs against the Nature Governance Index, an original longitudinal index measuring the evolution in nature governance laws over this period. Our results provide the first systematic empirical evidence that, despite the widespread embrace of private nature governance laws on the books across our studied jurisdictions from 1992 to 2015, the enhanced citizens’ rights conferred by these laws are not being consistently used in practice. They also reveal that, despite these inconsistencies in usage of the Aarhus mechanisms in practice, passing private governance laws can in fact improve levels of State enforcement of EU nature law in practice. For policymakers seeking to increase enforcement of EU nature law on the ground, harnessing what we term the shadow of heterarchy, by strengthening private governance rights, may therefore be a more effective means of doing so than simply ratcheting up existing traditional governance mechanisms such as levels of maximum criminal penalties or civil fines.

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