PurposeA virologic surveillance program for A(H7N9) virus was conducted from April 15, 2013 to February 14, 2014 in Guangzhou, aiming to clarify the geographical distribution of A(H7N9) viruses among live poultry markets (LPMs) and poultry farms in Guangzhou. Virological and serological surveys of poultry workers were also conducted to evaluate the risk of poultry-to-human transmission of the A(H7N9) virus.Methods36 retail LPMs, 6 wholesale LPMs and 8 poultry farms were involved in our surveillance program. About 20 live poultry and environmental samples were obtained from each surveillance site at every sampling time. Different environmental samples were collected to represent different poultry-related work activities. RT-PCR and virus culture were performed to identify the A(H7N9) virus. Hemagglutinin inhibition assay and RT-PCR were conducted to detect possible A(H7N9) infection among poultry workers.ResultsA total of 8900 live poultry and environmental samples were collected, of which 131(1.5%) were tested positive for A(H7N9) virus. 44.4% (16/36) of retail LPMs and 50.0% (3/6) of wholesale LPMs were confirmed to be contaminated. No positive samples was detected from poultry farms. A significant higher positive sample rate was found in environmental samples related to poultry selling (2.6%) and slaughtering (2.4%), compared to poultry holding (0.9%). Correspondingly, A(H7N9) viruses were isolated most frequently from slaughter zone. In addition, 316 poultry workers associated with the 19 contaminated-LPMs were recruited and a low seroprevalence (1.6%) of antibody against A(H7N9) virus was detected. An asymptomatic A(H7N9) infection was also identified by RT-PCR.ConclusionsOur study highlights the importance of conducting effective surveillance for A(H7N9) virus and provides evidence to support the assumption that slaughtering is the key process for the propagation of A(H7N9) virus in retail LPMs. Moreover, the ability of A(H7N9) virus to cross species barrier is proved to be still limited.

Background SARS-CoV-2 has been identified in the fecal matter of COVID-19 patients. However, sewage transmission has never been shown. In April 2020, a COVID-19 outbreak occurred in a densely populated community in Guangzhou, China. We investigated this outbreak to identify the mode of transmission. Method A home quarantined order was issued in the community. We collected throat swab samples from the residents and environmental samples from the surfaces inside and around the houses, and conducted RT-PCR testing and genome sequencing. We defined a case as a resident in this community with a positive RT-PCR test, with or without symptoms. We conducted a retrospective cohort study of all residents living in the same buildings as the cases to identify exposure risk factors. Result We found eight cases (four couples) in this community of 2888 residents (attack rate=2.8/1000), with onset during April 5–21, 2020. During their incubation periods, Cases 1-2 frequented market T with an ongoing outbreak. Cases 3-8 never visited market T during incubation period, lived in separate buildings from, and never interacted with, Cases 1-2. Retrospective cohort study showed that working as cleaners or waste picker (RR=13, 95% CIexact: 2.3-180), not changing to clean shoes after returning home (RR=7.4, 95% CIexact: 1.8-34), collating and cleaning dirty shoes after returning home (RR=6.3, 95% CIexact: 1.4-30) were significant exposure risk factors. Of 63 samples collected from street-sewage puddles and sewage-pipe surfaces, 19% tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Of 50 environmental samples taken from cases’ apartments, 24% tested positive. Viral genome sequencing showed that the viruses identified from the squat toilet and shoe-bottom dirt inside the apartment of Cases 1-2 were homologous with those from Cases 3-8 and those identified from sewage samples. The sewage pipe leading from the apartment of Cases 1-2 to the drainage had a large hole above ground. Rainfalls after the onset of Cases 1-2 flooded the streets. Conclusion Our investigation has for the first time pointed to the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 might spread by sewage. This finding highlighted the importance of sewage management, especially in densely-populated places with poor hygiene and sanitation measures, such as urban slums and other low-income communities in developing countries.

BackgroundGuangzhou reported its first laboratory-confirmed case of influenza A (H7N9) on January 10, 2014. A total of 25 cases were reported from the first wave of the epidemic until April 8, 2014. The fatality rate was much higher than in previous reports. The objective of the current work was to describe the clinical and epidemiological characteristics of A (H7N9) patients in Guangzhou and explore possible reasons for the high fatality rate.MethodsClinical and epidemiological information regarding A (H7N9) cases in Guangzhou was collected through review of medical records and field research. Data regarding clinical and laboratory features, treatment, and outcomes were extracted.ResultsOf the 25 patients, 84 % (21/25) had one or more underlying diseases. Fifteen patients (60.0 %) developed moderate to severe acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), and 14 (56 %) died of the ARDS or multiorgan failure. Patients with longer delay between onset of illness and initiation of oseltamivir treatment were more likely to develop ARDS. Elevated C-creative protein, aspartate aminotransferase, creatine kinase, and lymphocytopenia predicted a higher risk of developing ARDS.ConclusionsThe presence of underlying diseases and clinical complications predicted poor clinical outcome. Early oseltamivir treatment was associated with a reduced risk of developing ARDS.

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