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This paper explores the Estonian vision of Baltic identity. Estonia’s authorities have repeatedly articulated their scepticism towards the concept of a stand-alone ‘Baltic region’ and the inclusion of Estonia in it, preferring to position their state as a Nordic country. Yet, in numerous cases, they have clearly labelled Estonia as a Baltic State. To identify the contexts and meanings labelling the country as a Baltic State, this contribution provides a content analysis of official speeches given by Estonia’s political leadership. It is concluded that, despite the visibility of socioeconomic issues in the discourse, the most comprehensive image of Estonian ‘Balticness’ is constructed by interconnected narratives built around the Soviet past and the ‘security threats’ associated with Russia. The theoretical framework of regionalism, which allows one to consider the Baltics as a social construct rather than a set of material factors, provides an additional explanatory model.

This paper examines the impact of hypersonic threat on the evolution of the U.S. missile defense. The article analyzes the specifics of this threat, examines related doctrinal and practical changes, describes and characterizes planned defense architecture, forecasts the prospects for its implementation and impact on the strategic situation. The author comes to a conclusion that the U.S. – planned counter-hypersonic capabilities are aimed at countering the threat posed by intermediate-range and shorter-range boost-glide systems. Development of these capabilities is concentrated in three main domains: sensors, interceptors and advanced technologies. The most important and challenging goal of this development will be to ensure an effective integration and coordinated joint functioning of all the elements to be created within a unified command, control and communication system. The key driving force for the development of the U.S. counter-hypersonic capabilities is China. This conclusion follows not only from the fact that the PRC is currently the only state with boost-glide systems of less-than-intercontinental range in its arsenal, but also from the fact that future interceptors will be based on maritime platforms. By adapting its missile defense policy, the U.S. are clearly looking for opportunities to enhance its conventional deterrence capability against China in the context of increasing tensions in Asia-Pacific. The ongoing “hypersonic” evolution of the American missile defense will complicate arms control measures in this area. The integration of various elements of the emerging system implies building its architecture in such a way that limitations could have a major impact on its effectiveness. This could become a fundamental obstacle on the way to agreeing on measures to limit missile defenses in the future. Such situation may leave only some room for confidence-building measures capable of providing a certain level of transparency and predictability.

The West is concerned over the crisis of the liberal world order attributing it to the conduct of emerging powers, such as China, India and Russia. Are its concerns legitimate? Drawing on social identity theory, the authors analyze the emerging powers’ stances on international development through the lens of status dynamics. In particular, three issue areas are investigated: the debate over the UN development agenda, which has revealed differences between Western and non-Western approaches, the changes in the membership of donor and recipient groups over the last decade and the discourse of emerging countries concerning science and technology, which betrays their self-image of a “developed” or “laggard” state.The key finding of the paper is that the crisis of the liberal world order as a set of institutions created by the US-led countries after WWII manifests itself in the distorting symbolic exchange between developed and developing countries. The emerging states are unwilling to recognize the authority of the West and its leadership in setting the direction of global development. Meanwhile, they are trying to gain the status of development front-runners using their own foreign aid programs and science and technology development strategies. However, the rising states are not uniform and consistent in posing a symbolic challenge to the liberal order – while the Russia is striving for a “developed non-western country” status (thereby copying the USSR’s image), India and China, though to different degrees, are positioning themselves both as developed industrial states and as developing countries which receive aid packages from richer members of the international community. What leads to the distortions in this symbolic exchange is the desire of some emerging powers to use the resources of the West and reap the benefits of the world order created by it while denying it a high status. Thus, a classic economic “free-rider problem” arises in international relations: while benefiting from the liberal order created by the West, the rising states do not recognize the status it ascribes itself ignoring the symbolic hierarchy which, as viewed by western countries, underlies this order.The authors declare the absence of conflict of interest.

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